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I. INTRODUCTION

In view of the obvious mass confusion at the appellate level (at
least in the Fifth District) as to what standard of review the reviewing court should apply to a zoning case, I hope our Florida
Supreme Court will take jurisdiction in an appropriate case and instruct us on these matters. We obviously need some help!'
Rezoning, a term of land use law that has not always been well defined,2 is simply a government act which alters the permissible uses of
land in response to changing conditions in the uses of surrounding land.3
Moreover, rezoning has been recognized as an important tool with which
local government can ensure controlled and rational development of property consistent with a comprehensive future plan.' A municipality can
coordinate profitable development of land without overburdening the
area's resource base by enacting rezoning ordinances realistically tailored
to the area's needs.

1. Orange County v. Lust, 602 So. 2d 568, 576 (5th DCA) (W. Sharp, J., concurring), rev. denied, 613 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1992).
2. See, e.g., Troup v. Bird, 53 So. 2d 717, 720 (Fla. 1951) ("Admittedly, it is difficult to draw a
definite, distinct line of demarcation between rezoning and the granting of a variance from, or an exception to, zoning rules and regulations."). Many cases tend to blur the distinction between rezonings,
variances, and special exemptions. See, e.g., id. But see Mayflower Property, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 137 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962) (holding that a variance is "the relief granted from
the literal enforcement of a zoning ordinance permitting the use of property in a manner otherwise
forbidden upon a finding... [of] unnecessary hardship on a property owner."). Other sources call a
rezoning an amendment to an existing zoning ordinance. See, e.g., Schauer v. City of Miami Beach,
112 So. 2d 838, 839 (Fla. 1959); 1 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING 3D § 4.26

(1986).
3. 1 ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 4.26.
4. Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REv. 1154, 115455 (1955).
5. See 1 ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 5.14.
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In practice, however, rezoning decisions have not been completely left
to the unfettered discretion of local officials. When developers or individual landowners submit rezoning applications for small parcels of land to a
local zoning board, the probability of abuse,6 discrimination,7 or improper
planning8 increases. Local commissioners often substitute rational scrutiny
of rezoning applications with personal interest or favoritism.9 As a result,

zoning districts may develop haphazardly and in conflict with the comprehensive plan.'0

Judicial intervention in site-specific rezoning decisions serves to place
a check upon the discretion of the local zoning boards. Nonetheless,
courts in Florida and other jurisdictions have disagreed as to the precise
standard of judicial review. 2 Many jurisdictions, including Florida, have
traditionally characterized rezoning ordinances as legislative functions. 3

6. Mark Cordes, Policing Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Zoning Decisionmaking, 65 N.D. L.
REv. 161, 162-63, 168 (1989).
7. See Harold A. Ellis, Comment, Neighborhood Opposition and the Permissible Purposes of
Zoning, 7 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 275, 286, 293-94 (1992) (highlighting cases of discrimination
against mentally handicapped individuals, palm readers, and fortune tellers).
8. See Cordes, supra note 6, at 166-67.
9. Nicolas M. Kublicki, Comment, Land Use By, For, and of the People: Problems with the Application of Initiatives and Referenda to the Zoning Process, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 99, 104 (1991); see
also Cordes, supra note 6, at 168 (discussing how local officials rarely rely upon objective facts in
zoning decisionmaking).
10. See Cordes, supra note 6, at 168; Kublicki, supra note 9, at 103-04.
11. See Dean Booth, A Realistic Reexamination of Rezoning Procedure: The Complementary Requirements of Due Processand JudicialReview, 10 GA. L. REV. 753, 769-87 (1976) (discussing judicial review of zoning and the rezoning process); Cordes, supra note 6, at 179-89 (discussing how
courts have imposed impartiality requirements upon zoning boards); Carl J. Peckinpaugh, Jr., Comment, Burden of Proof in Land Use Regulation: A Unified Approach and Application to Florida, 8
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 499, 499-500 (1980) (discussing the optimal burden of proof and presumption of
validity which should be used by courts in reviewing zoning decisions).
12. Compare, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla. 1953) (en bane)
(per curiam) (deferential review), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 906 (1955) with Machado v. Musgrove,
519 So. 2d 629, 635 (3d DCA 1987) (en bane) (per curiam) (strict review), rev. denied, 529 So. 2d
694 (Fla. 1988).
13. See, e.g., Florida Land Co. v. City of Winter Springs, 427 So. 2d 170, 174 (Fla. 1983); City
of Miami Beach v. Weiss, 217 So. 2d 836, 837 (Fla. 1969); Lawley v. Town of Golfview, 174 So. 2d
767, 770 (Fla. 1965); Schauer, 112 So. 2d at 839; Lachman, 71 So. 2d at 148; Board of County
Comm'rs v. Monticello Drug Co., 619 So. 2d 361, 365 (1st DCA 1993), quashed sub nom. O'Connor
Dev. Corp. v. Leon County, 630 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1994); City Comm'n v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery
Co., 553 So. 2d 1227, 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); City of Jacksonville Beach v. Grubbs, 461 So. 2d
160, 163 (1st DCA 1984), overruled in partby Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469,
476 (Fla. 1993); Dade County v. Inversiones Rafamar, S.A., 360 So. 2d 1130, 1131-32 (Fla. 3d DCA
1978). But see infra part III.C.2 (discussing how Snyder rejected the legislative fairly debatable
standard).
Other jurisdictions have also found rezoning ordinances to be legislative. See Arnel Dev. Co. v.
City of Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565, 569 (Cal. 1980) (en bane); Consaul v. City of San Diego, 8 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 762, 768 (Ct. App. 1992); Frankel v. City & County of Denver, 363 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Colo.
1961); Delta Cascade Partners 1I v. Fulton County, 390 S.E.2d 45, 46 (Ga. 1990); Ward v. Village of
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Aggrieved parties could only appeal a legislative board decision, such as a
rezoning ordinance, by bringing a de novo injunction against the city or
board.' 4 Additionally, for courts to grant relief, the burdened party was
required to prove that the rezoning was discriminatory, capricious, or
unreasonable beyond any fair debate. 5 Judicial adherence to this deferential standard continued even after the introduction of statutory comprehensive planning. 6
In response to claims that judicial deference caused much of the arbitrary and abusive decisionmaking, 7 many courts rejected this traditional
standard." Courts began to characterize rezoning as a judicial or "quasijudicial"'9 function rather than a legislative function and thus, found a
means to scrutinize local decisionmaking. ° Under this "functional approach,"'" affected parties could appeal rezoning actions to an appellate
Skokie, 186 N.E.2d 529, 530-31 (Il1. 1962); Canteen Corp. v. City of Pittsfield, 346 N.E.2d 732, 735
(Mass. App. Ct. 1976); Robinson v. City of Bloomfield Hills, 86 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Mich. 1957);
Allred v. City of Raleigh, 178 S.E.2d 432, 440 (N.C. 1971); Brown v. Town of Davidson, 439 S.E.2d
206, 208 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); Sherill v. Town of Wrightsville Beach, 344 S.E.2d 357, 360 (Ct.
App.), rev. denied, 349 S.E.2d 600 (N.C. 1986); Donnelly v. City of Fairview Park, 233 N.E.2d 500,
501 (Ohio 1968); Tuber v. Perkins, 216 N.E.2d 877, 879 (Ohio 1966); O'Rourke v. City of Tulsa, 457
P.2d 782, 784 (Okla. 1969); Knowles v. City of Aiken, 407 S.E.2d 639, 642-43 (S.C. 1991); Hampton
v. Richland County, 357 S.E.2d 463, 466 (Ct. App. 1987), cert. dismissed, 370 S.E.2d 714 (S.C.
1988); Board of Supervisors v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 410 S.E.2d 648, 650 (Va. 1991); Seabrooke
Partners v. City of Chesapeake, 393 S.E.2d 191, 193-94 (Va. 1990); Barrick v. Board of Supervisors,
391 S.E.2d 318, 321 (Va. 1990).
14. Thompson v. City of Miami, 167 So. 2d 841, 843 (Fla. 1964); Harris v. Goff, 151 So. 2d
642, 644, 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963); see also De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 915 (Fla. 1957);
("Injunction has been many times employed to assault legislative action ... where such action allegedly impinged on some constitutional right. Attacks on municipal zoning ordinances are typical."); Jerry
L. Harris, Rezoning-Should It Be a Legislative or a JudicialFunction?, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 409, 409
(1979); David La Croix, The Applicability of CertiorariReview to Decisions on Rezoning, FLA. B.J.,
June 1991, at 105, 106.
15. See, e.g., Lachman, 71 So. 2d at 150-51.
16. See Charles L. Siemon, The Paradox of "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan" and
Post Hoc Rationalizations: The Need for Efficient and Effective Judicial Review of Land Use Regulations, 16 STEr. L. REv. 603, 612-13 (1987).
17. Michael S. Holman, Comment, Zoning Amendments-The Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Action, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 130, 132 (1972).
18. Lee County v. Sunbelt Equities, II, 619 So. 2d 996, 999-1002 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); accord
Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 595 So. 2d 65, 77-81 (5th DCA 1991), quashed, 627 So. 2d 469
(Fla. 1993); Hirt v. Polk County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 578 So. 2d 415, 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991);
Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 27 (1973) (en bane), overruled in part by
Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722, 725 (Or. 1980); Bassani v. Board of County Comm'rs,
853 P.2d 945, 948 (Ct. App.), rev. denied, 866 P.2d 40 (Wash. 1993); see also Holman, supra note
17, at 132 (suggesting that the designation of rezonings as judicial functions might protect the interests
of parties).
19. Although the terms "judicial" and "quasi-judicial" may arguably have some distinction, they
will be used interchangeably in this note to mean any action which takes on a judicial character or has
judicial attributes. See, e.g., Holman, supra note 17, at 130 n.4.
20. See authorities cited supra note 18.
21. This note uses the term "functional approach" or "functional analysis" to mean the technique
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court by writ of certiorari.' The reviewing court would then examine the
decision for procedural due process.' Finally, the court would apply
heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure that the zoning change conformed to
the comprehensive plan.24
Unfortunately, in the judiciary's attempt to reform site-specific rezoning, inconsistent interpretations of the functional approach have brought
confusion to Florida land use law.' To alleviate this confusion, some
courts have instead required that rezonings be consistent with a comprehensive plan.26 At long last, perhaps in response to Judge Sharp's appeal

for help,' the Florida Supreme Court in Board of County Commissioners
v. Snyde? 8 attempted to elucidate the legal significance of the relation-

ship between comprehensive plans and site-specific rezoning.29 Despite
the Supreme Court's decision, however, Florida's cities and legal practitioners have been left scrambling to understand the impact of Snyder on
rezoning policy. Furthermore, both the legislature and private landowners
have already questioned the current rezoning policy's ability to fairly
represent all interests involved."

of classifying government action as either legislative, judicial, or executive. Although this term has
been used by at least one Florida court, see Sunbelt Equities, 619 So. 2d at 1000, this author attributes
the initial development of the term to Michael Holman, who discussed the quasi-judicial and legislative functions of zoning boards. Holman, supra note 17, at 132.
22. See, e.g., Battaglia Fruit Co. v. City of Maitland, 530 So. 2d 940, 941 (5th DCA), cause
dismissed, 537 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1988).
23. Cf. City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1982) (explaining the
procedure for reviewing an administrative decision).
24. Id.
25. Given the overwhelming confusion between various legal standards of review for site-specific
rezonings, the Fifth District Court of Appeal has completely contradicted and ignored its own binding
precedent. See Paul R. Gougelman M, The Death of Zoning as We Know It, FLA. B.J., Mar. 1993, at
25, 29 n.34. For other contradictions of judicial opinion regarding rezonings, compare Snyder, 595 So.
2d at 81 (using the functional approach to require close judicial scrutiny of rezonings) with Orange
County v. Lust, 602 So. 2d 568, 571 (5th DCA) (en bane) (requiring deferential judicial review of
rezonings), rev. denied, 613 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1992). This confusion has existed between Florida District
Courts of Appeal. Compare id. at 571 (deferential review) and Monticello Drug, 619 So. 2d at 365
(deferential review) with Snyder, 595 So. 2d at 81 (strict review) and Machado, 519 So. 2d at 632
(strict review). This conflict of authority also has crossed state boundaries. Compare Marracci v. City
of Scappoose, 552 P.2d 552, 553 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (deferential review) with City of Cape Canaveral
v. Mosher, 467 So. 2d 468 (Fla.5th DCA 1985) (strict review).
26. See, e.g., Southwest Ranches Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Broward, 502 So. 2d 931, 936
(4th DCA), rev. denied, 511 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1987); City of Jacksonville Beach v. Grubbs, 461 So. 2d
160, 162 (1st DCA 1984), overruled in part by Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469,
476 (Fla. 1993).
27. Lust, 602 So. 2d at 576 (W. Sharp, J., concurring).
28. 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993), quashing 595 So. 2d 65 (5th DCA 1991).
29. See Haar,supra note 4, at 1156-58.
30. For example, a bill originally introduced by Florida House Representative Lee Constantine
(R-Altamonte Springs) seeks to guarantee the right of "[a]ny person not otherwise prohibited by statute
or ordinance" to discuss with any local public official "the merits of any matter on which action may
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Part II of this note provides a brief background to zoning and comprehensive planning in both the United States and Florida. Part III of this
note details the development of Florida's rezoning caselaw and the inherent conflicts in its interpretation. Part IV critically analyzes the Snyder
court's use of the functional approach and discusses its overall effect on
site-specific rezoning ordinances. Finally, part V summarizes the problems
of the functional approach and suggests stronger reliance upon the doctrine
of consistency with a comprehensive plan as a viable alternative.
II.BACKGROUND
The difference between zoning and planning is a key distinction in
land use law that has, until recently, slowly evolved. 3' While zoning refers to how land is used today, planning takes a prospective look to future
land use needs and goals.32 Historically, most jurisdictions zoned property
with little or no regard for future planning.3 But today states have begun
to enact and enforce comprehensive planning systems to protect land and
natural resources from overdevelopment. However, to understand the
law in a comprehensive planning state such as Florida, one must first
briefly trace the historical development of the zoning-planning relationship
from its origins.35
A. Origins of Zoning and Planning
Some of the first zoning regulations appeared in urban centers during
the early and middle 1800s, taking the form of building and fire codes.36

be taken by any board or commission on which the local public official is a member." Fla. H.B. 2585,
13th Legis., 2d Reg. Sess. (1994). The Senate has also sponsored a similar bill. See Fla. S.B. 262, 13th
Legis., 2d Reg. Sess. (1994). These bills could effectively overrule the Third District Court of
Appeal's decision establishing a cause of action for a person claiming prejudice from ex parte communication with members of a zoning board. Jennings v. Dade County, 589 So. 2d 1337, 1341 (3d DCA
1991), rev. denied, 598 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1992); see also infra part IV.B.2 (discussing impact of the
functional approach on ex parte contacts with elected officials). Additionally, a House bill attempting
to create the Private Property Rights Act of Florida would state that "all governmental entities should
recognize and respect judicially acknowledged and constitutionally protected property rights as those
entities develop and administer growth management policies." Fla. H.B. 485, 13th Legis.. 2d Reg.
Sess. (1994).
31. See Haar, supra note 4, at 1154-55 (discussing generally the relationship between zoning and
planning). For a discussion of the evolution of planning schemes in Florida, see Robert Lincoln, Comment, Inconsistent Treatment: The Florida Courts Struggle with the Consistency Doctrine, 7 J. LAND
USE & ENvTL. L. 333, 333-45 (1992).
32. 1 ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 1.03.
33. Haar, supra note 4, at 1157.
34. Jerry Mitchell, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan: The Rise of Strict Scrutiny in
Florida,6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 79, 85-86 (1990).
35. For a more in-depth historical explanation, see I ANDERSON, supra note 2, §§ 1.04-.08.
36. lid. § 1.04.
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As new cities began to spring up and existing urban populations exploded,
cities began to use relatively indiscriminate zoning to protect the sanctity
of residential areas from industrial growth and other nuisances. 7 By the

1920s, under the authority of express enabling acts,38 state and local governments widely implemented zoning ordinances against any degradation
of single-family neighborhoods. 9
Zoning practices went generally unapproved and unrestrained by the

judiciary until the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.'0 In Euclid, a landowner claimed

that a local comprehensive plan was unconstitutional because it served as
an arbitrary and confiscatory regulation of his property.4" The Court acknowledged that the realities of urban living justify zoning ordinances as
an exercise of state police power.42 Thus, the Euclid Court confirmed the

constitutional legitimacy of state zoning systems.
Nonetheless, the Euclid Court established a constitutional limitation on
zoning power. Zoning ordinances must substantially relate to "public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare" to pass constitutional muster.'
Zoning ordinances which met this test had to have a "fairly debatable"
relationship to the state interest at issue.!- Thus, the Supreme Court held
that courts must give complete deference to an ordinance 4 if the exis-

37. See Booth, supra note 11, at 755-56.
38. States and municipalities were given the authority to zone under the Department of
Commerce's Standard State Zoning Enabling Acts of 1924 and 1926 (SZEA) and the Standard City
Planning Enabling Act of 1928, which were adopted in some form by a majority of states. See Booth,
supra note 11, at 754-55; Haar, supra note 4, at 1155; Siemon, supra note 16, at 608. Interestingly,
Charles Siemon notes that the SZEA specified that zoning "shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan." Id.
39. Booth, supra note 11, at 756.
40. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
41. Id. at 386.
42. Id. at 387.
43. See id. at 397.
44. Id. at 395 (citing Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 531 (1917)). According to
the Court, some rational aims of zoning may include: fire prevention, traffic enforcement, suppression
of disorder, construction costs, exclusion of contagion, security of children, and protection of singlefamily dwellings from the encroachment of apartment dwellings. Id. at 391, 394-95.
45. Id. at 388. This is often referred to as the fairly debatable standard. See, e.g., City of Miami
Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla. 1953). Florida courts have noted that, despite confused
judicial statements to the contrary, the fairly debatable rule and the substantial relationship test, which
is used to measure the constitutional validity of legislative actions, are commensurate. Davis v. Sails,
318 So. 2d 214, 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). The substantial relationship component is a statement of
substantive law that creates a nexus between the ordinance and a legitimate state interest. Id. Thus, the
fairly debatable rule is used as a standard to test whether that nexus is established, or in other words,
whether the existence of the substantial relationship is fairly debatable. See id.
46. Euclid dealt with a facial attack on the constitutionality of a comprehensive plan. Euclid, 272
U.S. at 386 ("mhe effect of the allegations of the bill is that the ordinance of its own force operates
greatly to reduce the value of appellee's lands ... and the attack is directed, not against any specific
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tence of a "substantial
relationship" to a legitimate state concern 47 is fair48
ly debatable.
Despite the fact that Euclid provided states with the power to enact
long-term planning statutes, the idea of comprehensive and mandatory
planning did not take root for at least thirty years. 49 During the 1950s,
legal scholars" began to question the legislative and judicial apathy toward comprehensive planning.5 Eventually, state legislatures52 also began to recognize the need for mandatory comprehensive planning and
passed laws to make long-term planning a substantial part of the zoning
equation. 3
At the outset, localities were reluctant to exchange their self-interested
zoning motivations for the long-term benefits of coordinating ordinances
and comprehensive plans. 4 Local zoning boards, supported by the courts,

provision or provisions, but against the ordinance as an entirety."). However, in Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), the Court struck down a zoning ordinance as applied to specific
property. Id. at 188-89. The Court used the Euclid test and held that there was no evidence to show
that the local ordinance substantially related to the "public health, the public morals, the public safety,
or the public welfare in its proper sense." Id. at 187-88; accord Siemon, supra note 16, at 610 n.37.
But one commentator has noted:
Plainly, the Court believed the situation in Nectow was appropriate for judicial review, thus
distinguishing the as applied type of attack from the broad attack on the constitutionality of
an ordinance as a whole made in Euclid. It is equally clear that the Court intended only the
latter class of cases to be substantially shielded from judicial review by the presumption of
constitutionality. In the former class, courts not only would, but should scrutinize challenges to zoning decisions made by local authorities as applied to individual parcels of land.
Booth, supra note 11, at 758.
47. See supra note 44.
48. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388, 395; see also supra note 45 (noting that the fairly debatable test is
synonymous with a test for constitutional validity).
49. Siemon, supra note 16, at 611.
50. See, e.g., Haar, supra note 4, at 1174. For a historical analysis of this problem, see Siemon,
supra note 16, at 611-15.
51. Between Euclid and the mid-1970s, courts both in and out of Florida seemed to use the
phrase "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" as a factor for review of rezoning ordinances, but
this was merely paying lip service to planning, or as Siemon puts it, a game of "show us something
called a plan, anything, and we will let you get away with murder." Siemon, supra note 16, at 615.
For examples of this judicial attitude, see State ex rel. Henry v. City of Miami, 158 So. 82, 83 (Fla.
1934) (holding that a comprehensive plan need not be comprehensive or mandatory); Sarasota County
v. Walker, 144 So. 2d 345, 347-48 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962) (stating that zoning from residential to commercial will be deemed in accordance with the plan by board resolution, without more); Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 139 A.2d 749, 752 (N.J. 1958) (stating that a comprehensive plan need
not account for every possible use within a municipal area). But see Henry, 158 So. at 84 (Davis, C.J.,
concurring) (stating that the zoning ordinances must be "passed in aid" of a comprehensive plan in
order to be constitutional).
52. For example, Florida passed its planning statute in 1975. Local Government Comprehensive
Planning and Land Development Regulation Act (LGCPA), 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-257, §§ 1-19 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3215 (1993)).
53. Siemon, supra note 16, at 612.
54. See id. at 608. The idea of conforming land development decisions to a particular plan was
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were more inclined to make decisions and then justify them post hoc as
fairly debatable." Currently, however, many state legislatures and courts

have realized that following a comprehensive plan today ensures the availability of natural and man-made resources for tomorrow. 6 Not all states
are at the same point in adapting to the consistency approach, and jurisdictions still vary widely 7 in developing a sophisticated characterization of
the zoning-planning correlation." However, these developments in zoning
law provide the backdrop for analyzing the struggle over uniform judicial
review of local site-specific rezoning in Florida.
B. Statutory Development of Comprehensive Planning in Florida

Over the past twenty years, high-density coastal development 9 has
prompted the Florida legislature to look at comprehensive planning as a
check on zoning power.' In response to land and water management
problems caused by overdevelopment, the legislature introduced statutory
planning through the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and
Land Development Regulation Act (LGCPA).6 t In conjunction with other
environmental reform acts,62 this was a positive first step toward instituting land development control in Florida.63

presumably bad medicine for cities to swallow, as they preferred to conform them instead to, inter
alia, the protection of single-family residential areas, the retention of a solid tax base, and the practice
of exclusionary zoning. Mitchell, supra note 34, at 81; supra note 44 and accompanying text.
55. Siemon, supra note 16, at 606-07.
56. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 163.3161(1)-(3) (1993); Siemon, supra note 16, at 613-14.
57. For an extremely thorough and in-depth analysis of the diversity of thought on the relationship between regulation and planning, see Siemon, supra note 16, at 614-16 & nn.51-52.
58. Almost 40 years ago, while comprehensive planning was in its veritable infancy, see supra
notes 49-51 and accompanying text, Professor Haar perceived the irony inherent in the fact that courts
and legislatures have trouble conceptualizing such a link:
Of all the implementary tools available to city planners, zoning is by far the most frequently utilized, and the most likely to have an immediately discernible impact upon the lives of
the citizens in the community. Yet the relationship between the zoning ordinance and its
parent, the overall city plan, has been explored surprisingly seldom by courts and legislatures; and there is an apparent tendency to lose sight of the very fact that a fundamental
and necessary interrelation exists.
Haar, supra note 4, at 1154 (footnote omitted).
59. Siemon, supra note 16, at 619.
60. Mitchell, supra note 34, at 79.
61. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-257, §§ 1-19 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3215
(1993)).
62. See, e.g., Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. §§
380.012-.12 (1993); Florida Water Resources Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. §§ 373.012-.63 (1993).
63. Siemon, supra note 16, at 619 ('Out of this concern came some of the most ambitious planning legislation ever enacted in this nation.").
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The legislature amended LGCPA in 19856' and in 199365 to
strengthen the statute and to make compliance with state and regional
plans mandatory.66 However, the foray into comprehensive planning has
produced some negative side effects. First, in the race to pass local comprehensive plans, public opinion may take second place to expert testimony.67 LGCPA tries to address this concern by requiring local governments
to solicit and listen to public opinion whenever possible. 8 Second, state
control of development and resource management can deflate property
prices and restrict freedom to use land. In response to public fears of
overreaching governmental and regulatory power, amended versions of
LGCPA explicitly supported private property rights and compensation for
any state action which amounts to a taking.7" Thus, while the legislature

64. Omnibus Growth Management Act of 1985, 1985 Fla. Laws ch. 85-207, §§ 1-20.
65. Planning and Growth Management Act of 1993, 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93-206, §§ 1-2, 5-13.
66. The 1993 amendment changed two main areas of LGCPA. First, the Legislature added an optional "vision of the future physical appearance" component to the local comprehensive plan. 1993 Fla.
Laws ch. 93-206, § 5 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 163.3167(11) (1993)). This part of the plan represents
a local government's collective view for the anticipated appearance and "qualities of its community."
Id. Although this component is not a mandatory provision of the comprehensive plan, see FLA. STAT.
§ 163.3177(1)-(6) (1993), if included it must be consistent with the local and state comprehensive
plans and with similar state visions. FLA. STAT. § 163.3167(11) (1993). Additionally, any local government which creates such a vision must gear its comprehensive plan and improvement programs toward this goal. Id. By enacting this future vision component, the legislature seemed to strengthen the
emphasis on future local resource and growth management. Second, the 1993 LGCPA amendments
reinforced the legislature's commitment to private property rights. 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93-206, § I
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 163.3161(9) (1993)). This section states:
It is the intent of the Legislature that all [decisions under LGCPA] must be developed...
with sensitivity for private property rights and not be unduly restrictive, and property owners must be free from actions by others which would harm their property. Full and just
compensation ... must be provided to any property owner for a governmental action that is
determined to be an invalid exercise of the police power which constitutes a taking, as
provided by law....
Id.
67. JOSEPH F. DIMENTO, THE CONSISTENCY DOCTRINE AND THE LIMITS OF PLANNING 94-97
(1980).
68. FLA. STAT. § 163.3181(1) (1993) (emphasizing that public input is to be included if at all
possible); see also FLA. STAT. § 163.3174(4)(a) (1993) (stating that in creating a plan, local agencies
must have "at least one" public hearing with notice).
69. Property-rights advocates, such as David Lucas, have proposed legislation which would compensate landowners for significant devaluation of property occurring from antidevelopment regulations.
See PropertyRights Rally, GAINESVILLE SUN, Feb. 10, 1994, at 3B (picture and caption only).
70. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3161(9) (1993); supra note 66. However, the actual effectiveness of
this intent to protect rights of property owners from takings has arguably been diminished in recent
United States Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct.
2886, 2901-02 (1992). The United States Supreme Court has characterized a taking as either a physical
invasion of property or a denial of "all economically beneficial or productive use of land." Id. at 2893;
accord Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987). However, the Lucas Court
implied that the latter definition of a taking might not apply to a less than total decline in property
value which results from, for example, comprehensive planning or other similar regulation. Lucas, 112

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol45/iss5/4

10

Taylor: Untangling the Law of Site-Specific Rezoning in Florida: A Critic
SITE-SPECIFICREZONING IN FLORIDA

has responded to the problems of overdevelopment, it has attempted to
mitigate the negative effects of state planning.
C. Consistency with a Comprehensive Plan

With the development of statutory comprehensive planning, jurisdictions have had differing viewpoints as to how zoning decisions should be
consistent with such plans. Some statutes provide that the comprehensive

plan need only guide zoning decisions." On the other hand, many states,
including Illinois, Oregon, and Florida, have enacted statutes which require mandatory compliance with the plan.72 Courts and commentators
have generally applauded the stronger compulsory approach as an integral

part of zoning law reform.73 Additionally, one commentator has acknowledged that Florida's movement to a mandatory planning scheme averted
potential ecological and environmental disaster.74

Although Florida's planning statute requires conformity of all local
land use regulations and development orders75 with the comprehensive

S. Ct. at 2894 n.7 ("When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural tract
in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation as one in which the owner has
been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in
which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole.'). For a more detailed analysis of takings with respect to developmental regulations, see Thomas W. Ledman, Note,
Local Government Environmental Mitigation Fees: Development Exactions, the Next Generation,45
FLA. L. REV. 835, 848-53 (1993).
Furthermore, Lucas reaffirms the rule that no taking occurs when a regulation prohibits a "noxious use." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897. What may be even further disheartening to property-rights advocates is that the Lucas Court accepted the notion of a noxious use regulation as one which is " 'reasonably related to the implementation of a policy... expected to produce a widespread public benefit
and applicable to all similarly situated property.' "Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 133-34 n.30 (1978)); see also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35 ("Our cases have not
elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a 'legitimate state interest' . . . [but]
[t]hey have made clear, however, that a broad range of governmental purposes and regulations satisfies
these requirements.'). With this language, a court could possibly construe much of the LGCPA as
falling under the Lucas definition of a regulation, thus preempting any takings claim based on an
application of comprehensive planning goals. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2896-98.
71. 1 ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 5.07 n.61.
72. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 163.3161(6) (1993). However, courts in some states have paid mere
lip service to the idea of consistency with a comprehensive plan. Siemon, supra note 16, at 628; supra
note 51.
73. See Southwest Ranches Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Broward, 502 So. 2d 931, 936 (4th
DCA), rev. denied, 511 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1987); Mitchell, supra note 34, at 89-90.
74. See Siemon, supra note 16, at 619; supra text accompanying notes 59-63.
75. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3164(6) (1993); supra note 72. LGCPA also requires consistency between local plans and LGCPA itself, FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(9)(a) (1993), the state comprehensive
plan, and the regional policy plan. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(9)(c) (1993). Local plans must also be internally consistent. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(9)(b) (1993). The legislative standard for consistency of local
plans as a whole seems to be the fairly debatable standard. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3177(2), (9)(b),
.3184(10)(a) (1993).
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plan, the main question involves defining the measure of consistency."
Florida courts have interpreted consistency between rezonings and the plan
in two ways." First, several Florida courts have taken a flexible consistency approach.78 This analysis looks at a broad range of criteria to determine whether a rezoning ordinance is consistent with the general plan.79
Under this view, consistency is measured by looking at various factors, including land use, density, intensity, and the overall pattern of development
in the area.8" This allows cities to "downzone" or "underzone," a zoning
technique where areas marked for future development are initially zoned
for a less intense use.8' As those areas become suitable for development,
cities would gradually rezone them to a more intense level.8" With
downzoning, cites can achieve orderly development of property, especially
in areas currently unprepared for the onslaught of heavy residential or
commercial use.83
On the other hand, some courts have called for a strict interpretation
of consistency which prohibits any deviation from the general plan, regardless of the direction of the deviation.' This view of consistency
76. Surprisingly, the dictionary meaning of the word "consistency" is not very helpful. "Consistent" is defined as "[h]aving agreement with itself or something else; accordant; harmonious; congruous; compatible; compliable; not contradictory." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 308 (6th ed. 1990). According to this definition, "consistency" may either be not contrary to or compatible with the subject
of comparison. Arguably, a decision could be compatible with, yet contrary to, a comprehensive plan.
See infra text accompanying notes 79-81.
77. See Mitchell, supra note 34, at 88.
78. See Southwest Ranches, 502 So. 2d at 936; City of Jacksonville Beach v. Grubbs, 461 So. 2d
160, 163 (1st DCA 1984), overruled in part by Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469,
476 (Fla. 1993).
79. Southwest Ranches, 502 So. 2d at 937. The Southwest Ranches court analyzed the entire
legislative scheme and found several provisions which demonstrated "the legislature's intent that local
governments be given some flexibility in applying the plans." Id. The court examined FLA. STAT. §
163.3194(4)(a) (1985), which provides:
A court, in reviewing local government action on development regulations under this act,
may consider, among other things, the reasonableness of the comprehensive plan ... relating to the issue justiciably raised ....
The court may consider the relationship of the comprehensive plan ... to the governmental action taken or the development regulation involved in litigation of the statute.
Southwest Ranches, 502 So. 2d at 937 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(4)(a) (1985)). The Court also
cited FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(4)(b) (1985): "It is the intent of this act that the comprehensive plan set
general guidelines and principles concerning its purposes and contents and that this act shall be construed broadly to accomplish its stated purposes and objectives." Southwest Ranches, 502 So. 2d at
937 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(4)(b) (1985)). The Southwest Ranches court found that these
statutes provide a rationale for its flexible approach to consistency. Id.
80. Southwest Ranches, 502 So. 2d at 937 (citing FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(3) (1985)).
81. For example, in Grubbs the city downzoned its property incrementally, allowing it to create a
useful buffer zone between residential and commercial property in close proximity to the ocean.
Grubbs, 461 So. 2d at 161.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 162-63.
84. See Machado v. Musgrove, 519 So. 2d 629, 633 (3d DCA 1987), rev. denied, 529 So. 2d 694
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reads land planning statutes as rigid restrictions on local zoning decisions 5 and as protections against arbitrary or haphazard applications of
the law. 6 Any deviation in any degree or direction would be considered
inconsistent with that standard and thus violative of LGCPA.87 Although

one commentator has favored the strict definition of consistency, 8 Florida courts have been unable to settle upon a coherent definition of consistency with the comprehensive plan. 9
1H. APPROACHES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR FLORIDA
SITE-SPECIFIC REZONING DECISIONS

Traditionally, Florida courts have considered zoning ordinances legislative functions which could only be overturned if unconstitutional."
However, as inequity and arbitrariness of land use decisions increased,

legal scholars began to criticize this deferential approach and call for more
judicial scrutiny of rezoning decisionmaking. 9" Reformers in Florida and
elsewhere have suggested two principal methods of achieving judicial

reform: the functional approach and the consistency doctrine.92 Some
Florida courts have implemented these reforms, but they have done so

haphazardly, without developing a uniform statement of law.93 It is this
confusion that prompted the Florida Supreme Court in October 1993 to

attempt to clarify the law of site-specific rezonings.

(Fla. 1988); City of Cape Canaveral v. Mosher, 467 So. 2d 468, 471 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (Cowart, J.,
concurring).
85. Machado, 519 So. 2d at 632 n.2.
86. Id. at 634 (quoting City of Homestead v. Schild, 227 So. 2d 540, 543 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)).
87. Id. at 633-34.
88. See Mitchell, supra note 34, at 89. Professor Mitchell argues that the strict consistency approach is easier for courts to apply, is more consistent with modem, noncumulative zoning principles,
and is representative of LGCPA's intent. Id. at 89-90.
89. Compare supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (flexible consistency) with supra notes
84-88 and accompanying text (strict consistency).
90. See, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148, 149-50 (Fla. 1953) (en banc) (per
curiam), appealdismissed, 348 U.S. 906 (1955).

91. E.g., Holman, supra note 17, at 132.
92. Mitchell, supra note 34, at 80 (consistency doctrine); Holman, supra note 17, at 138-39, 14243 (functional approach); Lincoln, supra note 31, at 377-82 (consistency doctrine). Often, the two approaches are used together. Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 474-76 (Fla. 1993);
Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 26, 28-30 (1973) (en banc), overrded in part by
Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722, 725 (Or. 1980).
93. See, e.g., Snyder v. Board of County Comm'rs, 595 So. 2d 65, 80 (5th DCA 1991)
(functional approach), quashed, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993); Hirt v. Polk County Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 578 So. 2d 415, 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (functional approach); Machado, 519 So. 2d at
632 (strict consistency approach); Southwest Ranches, 502 So. 2d at 936 (flexible consistency approach); Grubbs, 461 So. 2d at 163 (flexible consistency approach).
94. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 470-71.
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A. Site-Specific Rezoning as a Legislative Function
Florida courts began to adopt the legislative standard of Euclid as
early as the 1930s." In applying the Euclid standard of review to particular parcels of property, courts found that zoning boards performed a legislative function.96 Thus, the owner of property had the burden of showing
that the ordinance was arbitrary or unreasonable and not in the interest of
public health, safety, or general welfare." Later Florida cases used
Euclid's fairly debatable language to describe the quantum of evidence
needed to show reasonableness of a zoning ordinance.9"
The Florida Supreme Court then developed this deferential standard of
judicial review for amendments of both non-site-specific and site-specific
zoning ordinances." In City of Miami Beach v. Lachman,"° the court

applied the fairly debatable rule to a general rezoning of property.'

In

its rationale, the Lachman court cited the doctrine of separation of powers 10 2 as applicable to rezonings °3 Thus, the court concluded that re-

95. See State ex rel. Taylor v. City of Jacksonville, 133 So. 114, 116 (Fla. 1931).
96. E.g., id.
97. See id. This falls under the strong presumption of validity that naturally flows from legislative action. I ANDERSON, supra note 2, § 2.14. But see Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S.
61, 77 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[Tihe presumption of validity that traditionally attends a
local government's exercise of its zoning powers carries little, if any, weight [against the First
Amendment].").
98. See City of Miami Beach v. Prevatt, 97 So. 2d 473, 476 (Fla. 1957); Town of Surfside v.
Abelson, 106 So. 2d 108, 109-10 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958).
99. An amendment of a zoning ordinance which effectively changes the use classification for a
large area of land has been labeled a "rezoning." Troup v. Bird, 53 So. 2d 717, 720 (Fla. 1951). The
term "rezoning" is also used for changing the use classification for particular parcels of land. See, e.g.,
Lawley v. Town of Golfview, 174 So. 2d 767, 768-69 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965) (using rezoning to describe
change in zoning for a piece of property 136.75 feet by 77 feet); supra note 2 (explaining the blurred
distinctions between various types of zoning ordinances).
100. 71 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1953), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 906 (1955).
101. Id. at 151-52. Ten property owners of 86 lots appealed the city's refusal to rezone their property from single-family residential to multi-family residential. Id. The residents owned about two miles
of what was at that time the most valuable coastal area in the world. Id. at 151. Due to the enormously
,rapid growth of Miami Beach during this period, the cost of maintaining single-family homes on the
parcels far outweighed any income received from renting the homes. Id. The city claimed that such a
rezoning would overtax the area's sewer, water, and firefighting services, and would precipitate the
community's decay. Id. at 152.
In deciding Lachman, the Florida Supreme Court focused on both the validity of the zoning
ordinance as well as the validity of the city's decision to deny the landowners' rezoning petition. Compare id. at 152 (discussing the ordinance) with id. at 151-52 (discussing the reasonableness of the
city's failure to rezone). Given the direct relationship between the two issues, the court seems to treat
them interchangeably. For this reason, it can presumably be said that Lachman contemplates a fairly
debatable review of rezoning ordinances as well as original zoning ordinances, and that the landowners
were really protesting the city's decision to deny the rezoning petition.
102. See id. at 150 (suggesting judicial interference is due only when legislative action is unconstitutional). The doctrine of separation of powers recognizes that the judicial branch cannot invade upon
functions of the legislative branch. See, e.g., United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 491 (1979)

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol45/iss5/4

14

Taylor: Untangling the Law of Site-Specific Rezoning in Florida: A Critic
SITE-SPECIFICREZONING IN FLORIDA

zoning ordinances were legislative in nature and should be shielded from
judicial intervention."
Additionally, the Lachman court noted that, according to Euclid, a
zoning provision must have some substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare in order to be constitutional. 5 Employing the separation of powers doctrine and Euclid's constitutional limitations, the court reasoned that it could only reverse a local rezoning deci-

sion if it infringed upon some constitutional right."° Therefore, the
Lachman court concluded that the fairly debatable test should apply for
judicial review of general-area rezoning decisions."W
Using Lachman, the Florida Supreme Court applied this traditional
approach to site-specific rezoning decisions. In City of Miami Beach v.
Wiesen,' the issue was whether a court could require a city to rezone

(holding that congressional privilege prevents intrusion by the judiciary into an independent sphere of
legislative government); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950) (holding that the judiciary cannot review a congressional determination to exclude aliens). Although this
federal constitutional doctrine is not directly applicable to the states, it is required by the Florida Constitution. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
103. Lachman, 71 So. 2d at 150. The court delineated the judicial power to strike down a legislative decision by quoting United States Supreme Court Justice John Marshall:
"When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the
constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional.... This duty of
the courts to maintain the constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and
unceasing" and applies as imperatively when properly invoked [by a court] against a zoning
ordinance as it does against an act of the legislature.
Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395).
106. Id. The court stated:
[Local rezoning] ordinances.., will be given serious consideration and their judgments
great weight, but where it is conclusively shown that they deprive one of his property without due process or otherwise infringe on State or Federal constitutional guarantees unreasonably, such ordinances and regulations cannot be said to be reasonably debatable and will
be stricken down.
Id. The court also uses the words "arbitrary" and "unreasonable" to describe an unconstitutional ordinance. Id. It is interesting to note that the Lachman court compares its facts to those in City of Miami
Beach v. First Trust Co., 45 So. 2d 681 (1949), reh'g granted, 45 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1950) (Terrell, J.).
See Lachman, 71 So. 2d at 151. In FirstTrust, the removal of zoning restrictions from a parcel of land
did not jeopardize or materially change a general city zoning plan. First Trust, 45 So. 2d at 688
(Terrell, J.). The court contrasted Lachman with First Trust on the facts and found no inconsistency of
law. Lachman, 71 So. 2d at 151.
107. Lachman, 71 So. 2d at 152-53.
108. 86 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1956) (en banc). In Wiesen, owners of three lots claimed that a city rezoning ordinance "was unreasonable, arbitrary, and confiscatory." Id. at 444. The property in question
was originally zoned for single-family residences. Id. at 443. The owners complained that the original
classification was too restrictive and sought an injunction declaring the ordinance invalid. Id. at 44344. The lower court granted the injunction and required the city to rezone the property. Id. at 444.
After the Florida Supreme Court denied the city's petition for certiorari, City of Miami Beach v.
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property to a specific intensity."c In addressing this issue, the court stated that in enacting zoning ordinances, a city relies upon "an acute knowledge of existing conditions and circumstances.""' The court found that
any analysis of a site-specific rezoning decision should be extremely limited and that a court "should not substitute its judgment for that of the local
zoning authorities."''. The Wiesen court stated that the Lachman fairly
debatable standard of judicial review governs site-specific rezoning decisions." 2 Because the landowners failed to show that the rezoning ordinance was not fairly debatable," 3 the city did not unconstitutionally exercise its zoning power." 4
Unfortunately, the application of this deferential standard to other
rezoning cases produced some unwelcome results. In Schauer v. City of
Miami Beach,"5 a municipality rezoned an area of land from single-family to multi-family residential." 6 In addressing an alleged conflict of interest," 7 the majority reasoned that non-site-specific rezonings were legislative in character."' The Florida Supreme Court wrote that a court
9
could not question the propriety or motivation behind a legislative act'.
' 20
overreaching."'
or
in an attempt to annul it, except in cases of "fraud
Thus, the court concluded that the rezoning vote was valid notwithstand-

Wiesen, 73 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1954), the city rezoned the property for hotel and apartment use. Wiesen,
86 So. 2d at 444. The landowners filed another request for injunction, asking the court to force the
city to rezone the property for business use. Id. The lower court entered an order requiring the city to
rezone two lots for business use. Id.
109. Wiesen, 86 So. 2d at 444.
110. Id. at 445.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 444-45 (citing Lachman, 71 So. 2d at 150).
113. Id. at 445-46.
114. Id. at 446. The court concluded that coming to any other conclusion would, by "judicial
erosion," destroy the entire general zoning plan. Id.
115. 112 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1959).
116. Id. at 839. This classification allowed property owners to construct and operate apartment
buildings and hotels. Id.
117. Id. In this case, the landowner contended that one of the council members was improperly influenced to vote for the rezoning, which would have increased the value of the council member's
property by $600,000, and that he should have been disqualified from voting. Id. Citing the legislative
nature of the proceeding, see id. at 839-40, the court refused to inquire into the issue of illicit influence which failed to "amount to fraud or overreaching." Id. at 841. But cf. Jennings v. Dade County,
589 So. 2d 1337, 1341 (3d DCA 1991) (stating that the presence of ex parte communication creates a
presumption of prejudice), rev. denied, 598 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1992).
118. Schauer, 112 So. 2d at 839 ("It is obvious to us that the enactment of the original zoning
ordinance was a legislative function and we cannot reason that the amendment of it was of different
character.").
119. Id. at 840-41.
120. Id. at 841. Justice Thornal concurred with this opinion, but also reasoned that the court had to
"recognize the line that separates the exercise of legislative power from judicial power," thus implicitly
applying the Lachman analysis for legislative actions. Id. (Thornal, J.,
concurring).
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ing evidence that a council member's property 2 would have substantially
appreciated in value as a result of the rezoning.1 1
In light of the majority's "hands off" doctrine," Justice Roberts
penned a strong dissent."2 He argued that the majority's legislative labeling of a local body that has both legislative and judicial functions creates inherent difficulties. 24 Despite his acknowledgement that many
courts have held to the contrary, Justice Roberts stated that zoning boards

took on a "quasi-legislative-judicial" capacity when considering rezoning
issues."as Thus, he concluded that the council member's ulterior interest
created a "legal fraud" and that the court should have disqualified the
council's vote on the rezoning.126 However, more importantly, Justice
Roberts' dissent reveals some of the early difficulties that courts encoun-

tered in classifying rezonings as legislative functions.27

121.
122.
123.
Roberts

Id. at 841.
Id. at 842 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Id. at 841-43 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Discouraged by the effects of this analysis, Justice
stated:

[I]n those cases where official action of a municipal body must be based on what is commonly thought of as a "judicial" inquiry, the courts are authorized to and should intervene
to determine whether the preliminary judicial inquiry was made by a completely disinterested and impartial body, even though the official action partakes sufficiently of a "legislative"
character....
Id. at 842 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting).
125. Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting). From his argument, especially with the creation of the term "quasi-legislative-judicial municipal activity," id. (Roberts, J., dissenting), it is unclear how Justice Roberts
concludes that rezonings are judicial in character. He initially admits that "[it is well settled that the
enactment of a comprehensive zoning ordinance is... legislative.., and this court holds with the
majority of other courts that the amendment of a zoning ordinance ... is sufficiently legislative in
character to require that it be done by the city's legislative body." Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting). But
then he writes: "Yet it cannot be doubted that the preliminary inquiry necessary to determine whether
a change in zoning should be made ... is judicial in nature." Id. at 843 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Thus,
the dissenters claimed, seemingly with the single stroke of a pen, that the rezoning inquiry was more
judicial than legislative. Id. (Roberts, J., dissenting).
The dissent in Schauer probably marks the genesis of the functional approach in Florida. For a
full introduction to this approach, see infra notes 149-75 and accompanying text. This analysis has
been a primary method for commentators and courts to suggest and implement zoning law reform. See
Snyder v. Board of County Comm'rs, 595 So. 2d 65, 80 (5th DCA 1991), quashed, 627 So. 2d 469
(Fla. 1993); Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 26-30 (1973) (en banc), overruled in
part by Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722, 725 (Or. 1980); Holman, supra note 17, at 13443. However, the lack of clarity associated with the functional approach has, in this author's view,
permeated judicial opinions and contributed to the overall confusion in land use law. See, e.g., supra
note 25.
126. Schauer, 112 So. 2d at 843 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Thirty-two years later, the Third District
would finally get its revenge on the Schauer court with respect to ex parte communication. See
Jennings, 589 So. 2d at 1341-42 (holding that an ex parte communication creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice).
127. See supra note 125.
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As courts began to accept the legislative standard, their decisions also
1 28
influenced the method by which parties could seek judicial review.
The Florida Supreme Court has differentiated the method of review of
legislative functions from that of judicial functions. 29 First, the court has
noted that state statutes or municipal ordinances may provide for appellate
procedure, and that if a procedural requirement exists, then it must be followed. t3 When the legislature has not determined the form of appeals,
however, injunction' 3' and a trial de novo has typically been the remedy
for state and local legislative action, including municipal zoning ordinances.'32 Because courts have found that site-specific rezonings are legislative acts,'33 a party can only seek injunctive relief from such decisions.'34

128. At first glance, the procedural ramifications of both the traditional and functional approaches
seem to be insignificant. However, in many cases, the nature of the review-whether it is judicial or
legislative-has a direct effect upon the procedural aspects of review. The consequential procedural
results of the functional dichotomy are virtually endless. See infra note 363.
129. See De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 914-16 (Fla. 1957) (en banc).
130. Id. at 915; see also Battaglia Fruit Co. v. City of Maitland, 530 So. 2d 940, 942 (5th DCA)
(noting that Orange County allows certiorari review by ordinance), cause dismissed, 537 So. 2d 568
(Fla. 1988); Grady v. Lee County, 458 So. 2d 1211, 1212 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (same in Lee County);
Rose v. Dade County, 332 So. 2d 136, 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (same in Dade County). For a more
detailed discussion on the judicial treatment of review, see La Croix, supra note 14, at 105, 108 n.9.
131. An injunction by writ of mandamus is a collateral assault on a legislative action which allegedly violated a constitutional right. De Groot, 95 So. 2d at 915. On the other hand, certiorari is a "discretionary writ bringing up for review by an appellate court the record of an inferior tribunal or agency
in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding." Id. at 915-16. An injunction differs procedurally from a
petition for certiorari in that an injunction requires a complete trial on the merits. See id. at 915;
Wiesen, 86 So. 2d at 443-44. A petition for writ of certiorari will look only at the record below to
determine if (1) due process was violated; (2) the lower court correctly applied the law to the case;
and, (3) at the circuit court level, the lower court's findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence. City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1982); Lee County v.
Sunbelt Equities, II, 619 So. 2d 996, 1003 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).
132. De Groot, 95 So. 2d at 915. However, previous zoning statutes have made this standard
historically confusing. For example, under FLA. STAT. § 176.17 (1971), repealed by 1973 Fla. Laws
ch. 73-129, the legislature provided for review of board of adjustment resolutions, typically considered
quasi-judicial, by certiorari but allowed a de novo proceeding. Josephson v. Autrey, 96 So. 2d 784,
787 (Fla. 1957). Additionally, the former zoning enabling act, FLA. STAT. § 163.250 (1983), repealed
by 1985 Fla. Laws ch. 85-55, allowed either an injunction and trial de novo or a petition for certiorari
and limited review.
133. See, e.g., Wiesen, 86 So. 2d at 445.
134. However, the method of review is different once a circuit court has granted or denied the
request for injunctive relief. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d at 626. Although many courts have confused this
issue, the Vaillant court, quoting the lower court's opinion, succinctly stated:
[Clommon sense dictates that no one enjoys three full repetitive reviews to,
1. a civil service board
2. a circuit court
3. a district court of appeal....
Id. at 626 (quoting City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 399 So. 2d 1045, 1047 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)).
While a complainant may have a full de novo review to a trial court, any subsequent appeal will be by
writ of certiorari. See id. at 625-26.
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Additionally, Florida courts have explained the impact of the legislative standard upon due process rights, such as notice, opportunity to be
heard, and the right to cross-examine witnesses. 5 In Harris v. Goff,136
the Florida Supreme Court obliquely stated that legislative acts themselves
do not carry the "characteristics or safeguards of a quasi-judicial proceeding," including notice and opportunity to be heard. 37 Nonetheless, a state

or municipality, by statute or ordinance, may require certain standards of
procedural due process for rezoning hearings.'

But the Harris court

noted that legislative acts are not required to be cloaked
in the traditional
39
due-process uniform of their judicial counterparts.

B. Site-Specific Rezoning as a JudicialFunction
By the early 1970s, the traditional legislative standard of judicial re-

view had become firmly entrenched in Florida, as well as in many other
jurisdictions throughout the country."4 Armed with a strong presumption
of constitutionality, 4 ' a heavy burden of rebuttal, 42 and limited judicial
review,'43 the legislative approach theoretically gave local governments

wide discretion to implement rational development policies and comprehensive planning."
However, commentators and courts alike have rejected the application
of the legislative function to site-specific rezonings because of resulting

impropriety, discrimination, and misuse. 4 In addition, some commentators have argued that this deferential attitude allows cities to violate comprehensive plans to such an extent that a plan may realistically cease to
exist.' Moreover, courts have criticized the legislative model for not

135. Harris v. Goff, 151 So. 2d 642, 644 (Fla. Ist DCA 1963); accord Bloomfield v. Mayo, 119
So. 2d 417, 421 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960).
136. 151 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963).
137. Id. at 644.
138. See, e.g., Coral Reef Nurseries v. Babcock Co., 410 So. 2d 648, 652-53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
("[A rezoning hearing] contains the safeguards of due notice, a fair opportunity to be heard in person
and through counsel, the right to present evidence, and the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses .... ); Gougelman, supra note 25, at 25 ("Site-specific rezoning proceedings in Dade County,
which are considered to be quasi-judicial in nature, form a notable exception to the general rule [of
legislative character].").
139. See Harris, 151 So. 2d at 644.
140. See authorities cited supra note 13.
141. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
142. See Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395-96 (1926); supra text accompanying note 113.
143. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
144. See Haar,supra note 4, at 1154-58.
145. See Holman, supra note 17, at 132; supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
146. Booth, supra note 11, at 763; Siemon, supra note 16, at 628.
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accurately representing the realities of rezoning decisionmaking.' 47 With
so many observed flaws in the deferential system, many commentators
pressed for zoning law reforms.'
1. Genesis of the Functional Approach
Although advocates of zoning reform have suggested various formulas
for changing rezoning procedure, 49 the functional approach has probably
received the most notoriety and possibly the best reception in the
courts. 5 The functional approach looks at both the nature and impact of
governmental action to determine whether it is legislative or quasi-judicial
in nature. 5' In essence, the approach creates an inherent dichotomy of
power.'52 When government actions have enough characteristics of judicial decisionmaking, they should be termed "quasi-judicial."'' 3 When local decisions take on a predominantly legislative form and function, they
should be treated as legislative.'54
Although it is sometimes difficult to differentiate between legislative
and quasi-judicial acts,'
there are some distinguishing
characteristics.'56 First, legislative activity results in the creation of a

147. See Sunbelt Equities, 619 So. 2d at 1001; Fasano, 507 P.2d at 26.
148. See, e.g., Siemon, supra note 16, at 630-31.
149. Carl Peckinpaugh provides examples of one such alternative, which creates a shifting burden
of proof. Peckinpaugh, supra note 11, at 500-03. Under this theory, once a landowner has made a
prima facie showing that a rezoning is arbitrary or unreasonable, the burden would shift to the city to
show that it was not. Id. at 502. This approach has been criticized as either too harsh or too lenient on
cities. Id. at 503. Michael Holman also recognizes the possibility that legislatures could reform the
zoning statutes. Holman, supra note 17, at 132. In any event, this note focuses mainly upon the functional approach. See supra note 21.
150. E.g., Fasano, 507 P.2d at 26-27; accord Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 542 P.2d 371, 375-76
(1975), overruled in part by Margolis v. District Court, 638 P.2d 297, 305 (Colo. 1981); Golden v.
City of Overland Park, 584 P.2d 130, 135 (Kan. 1978); Roger A. Cunningham, Rezoning by Amendment as an Administrative or Quasi-JudicialAct: The "New Look" in Michigan Zoning, 73 MICH. L.
REV. 1341, 1342 (1975) (indicating a recent trend toward the functional approach in Michigan);
Peckinpaugh, supra note 11, at 505 (discussing Oregon's use of the functional approach).
151. See Booth, supra note 11, at 767; Holman, supra note 17, at 134; Peckinpaugh, supra note
11, at 504-06.
152. Although the functional approach can be used to distinguish judicial from executive decisions, e.g., De Groot, 95 So. 2d at 915, this note will not contend that rezoning decisions are executive
innature.
153. See Holman, supra note 17, at 134-35.
154. See id. at 135.
155. See Snyder v. Board of County Comm'rs, 595 So. 2d 65, 71 (5th DCA 1991), quashed, 627
So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993). This occurs when a single governing body performs different functions. For
example, zoning boards are vested with the legislative function in creating a comprehensive plan, the
judicial function in granting variances and special exemptions, and the executive function in hiring
agents to enforce zoning and building codes. Id. In this situation, one board puts on various "functional hats" depending upon the job at hand. Id.
156. See Holman, supra note 17, at 134-36.
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general rule," 7 while judicial activity seeks to apply a given rule to some
one party or parties. 5 ' Although the division between these activities can
be seen as a "legislative body passing a law and the judicial body applying it,"' 9 many municipal bodies exercise multiple functions which tends
to hamper differentiation between judicial and legislative functions."6
Second, the functional analysis states that legislative action is prospective, examining desirable policies for the future, while judicial action is
retrospective, focusing on the present state of fact and law.' However,
this distinction may not always apply, as judicial goals often reflect the
future trends and developments of both the facts and the law.
Finally, the functional approach considers legislative action to be
broad in application and reflective of general situations, contingencies, or
individuals.'63 On the other hand, judicial action "is narrow in scope, focusing on specific individuals or on specific situations."'" This is an impact-oriented analysis of the action needed to limit infringement upon an
individual's rights."6
Given these differences between legislative and judicial action, the
approach sums up a test of general validity:
Does the action formulate a general rule or policy which is applicable to an open class of persons, interests, or situations, or does
the action apply a general rule or policy to specific persons, interests, or situations? If the answer is yes to the latter half of the
question, then legislative action is present. If the answer is yes to
the first half of the question, then there is judicial action."
After applying this test, actions which meet the legislative function definition are accorded the traditional presumption of validity. 67 In the scope
of zoning law, an individual challenging a particular legislative zoning

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 135.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 136; see also infra part IV.A (critiquing the application of the functional approach

theory).
163. Holman, supra note 17, at 134-35.
164. Id. at 134 (footnotes omitted). In support of this point, Florida courts have almost universally
considered variances and special exemptions as judicial (or administrative) in nature. See, e.g., Snyder,
595 So. 2d at 72; City of Melbourne v. Hess Realty Corp., 575 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991);
Walgreen Co. v. Polk County, 524 So. 2d 1119, 1120 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Mayflower Property, Inc.
v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 137 So. 2d 849, 853 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962).
165. See Holman, supra note 17, at 135.
166. Id. at 136 & n.59.
167. See id. at 130-31.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 5 [1993], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

ordinance would have to show that it was either arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable according to the fairly debatable test. 8 However, once a
court finds an action to be judicial, that action must meet the fairly debatable standard plus a due process inquiry.'69
Applying the functional test to zoning decisions, site-specific rezoning
ordinances are considered quasi-judicial for two main reasons. 7 First,
the change of property's use classification places additional burdens or
benefits only upon that specific piece of land. 7' Second, because
rezonings are essentially applications of "existing but often unstated land
use policies" to a specific parcel of land, such actions are equivalent to an
adjudication.' Thus, when a city enacts a zoning ordinance, it performs
a legislative function.'73 But by applying the ordinance, together with
unstated policy, to a particular piece of property, the city acts judicially.' Therefore, the functional analysis states that site-specific rezonings
are judicial in nature and courts must scrutinize them for due process
violations."'

168. Id. at 131, 139 n.73.
169. See id. at 139.
170. Id. at 137. However, comprehensive rezonings are considered legislative because such actions
would create "major changes to the zoning map." Id. at 136 (footnote omitted). The only difficulty in
this theory is drawing a line between site-specific and general rezonings. Holman has suggested that
rezonings of more than 20 acres are legislative. Id. at 136 n.61.
171. Id. at 137.
172. Id. at 138. To Holman, the use of unstated policy in granting or denying rezoning proposals
explains the relationship between zoning and planning. Id. But see Haar, supra note 4, at 1154-58
(stating that the relationship between zoning and planning is grounded in the idea that zoning decisions must comport with a comprehensive plan). Holman provides two examples of such "unstated
land use policies": (1) "a policy conditioning approval of the zoning amendment upon the guarantee of
prompt development in accordance with an approved plot plan," and (2) "a policy excluding mobile
homes even though a mobile home district is provided in the zoning code." Holman, supra note 17. at
138 & n.70. Thus, it seems that these are merely examples of local rules that are not codified or enacted by an ordinance. However, it is unclear whether the application of stated as opposed to unstated
land policies would make the analysis any different. Holman may be implying that the application of
unstated policy fosters post hoc rationalization and abuse of discretion; therefore, cities must support
site-specific rezoning decisions with findings that detail the unstated policies involved. See id. at 139.
Although this may well be true, similar post hoc decisionmaking also occurs when zoning boards
apply stated policy (like zoning ordinances) in such a way as to cause possible harm to property owners. See Siemon, supra note 16, at 619-20.
173. Holman, supra note 17, at 138.
174. Id. at 138-39. But see supra note 172 (questioning reliance upon unstated policy as the basis
of finding judicial action).
175. Holman, supra note 17, at 139. Holman states that the standard of judicial review for sitespecific rezonings would approximate the legislative fairly debatable test. Id. Again, interpreting
Holman's viewpoint, a court could only overturn a rezoning decision if it does not meet due process
requirements, i.e., failure to provide a fair and impartial hearing, see id. at 139-41, or arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable action. Id. at 139 & n.73.
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2. Fasano:The Initial Judicial Application of
the Functional Approach
The functional approach advocated a revolutionary position with respect to land use law and site-specific rezoning decisions.'76 However,
the Oregon Supreme Court provided the seminal judicial decision implementing this approach.'" That decision, Fasano v. Board of County
Commissioners,' has been cited by many other courts which have rejected the traditional legislative approach and applied a form of the func-

tional approach.'79
In Fasano, the court faced two primary issues: whether the Board's

decision was legislative or judicial, and what kind of burden of proof and
standard of review should be required.' In addressing the first issue, the
court found that while most jurisdictions have historically viewed
rezonings as legislative action, 8' such a classification ignored the true

character of site-specific rezonings.

s2

Local government actions cannot

always receive legislative deference because they are not "the equivalent
in all respects of state and national legislatures."'' Relying in part upon

176. See supra part nI.B.1.
177. See Mitchell, supra note 34, at 88-89.
178. 507 P.2d 23 (1973) (en banc), overruled in part by Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d
722, 725 (Or. 1980).
179. See Snyder, 595 So. 2d at 76, 78; Lee County v. Sunbelt Equities, II, 619 So. 2d 996, 100001 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Machado v. Musgrove, 519 So. 2d 629, 632 (3d DCA 1987), rev. denied, 529
So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1988); Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 542 P.2d 371 (1975), overruled in part by
Margolis v. District Court, 638 P.2d 297, 305 (Colo. 1981); Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 573 P.2d 359,
363 (Wash. 1978). But see Hampton v. Richland County, 357 S.E.2d 463, 466 (Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting Fasano), cert. dismissed, 370 S.E.2d 714, 715 (S.C. 1988) (limiting rejection of Fasano to dictum); Quinn v. Town of Dodgeville, 354 N.W.2d 747, 753-54 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (rejecting
Fasano).
180. See Fasano, 507 P.2d at 25-29. In Fasano,a development company which owned 32 acres of
property zoned for single family residential use requested a rezoning to planned residential use in
order to construct a mobile home park. Id. at 25. The Board of County Commissioners accepted the
new classification. Id. According to the Fasano court, this zoning classification provided for planned
residential developments and "open space for utilities, access, and recreation." Id. The classification
also required that the land be ten or more acres in size and should be located in or near a residential
zone. Id. Fasano, a lawyer and homeowner in Washington County, sued the Board to disallow the
rezoning of the property. Id.
181. Id. at 26 (quoting Smith v. County of Washington, 406 P.2d 545, 547 (Or. 1965)).
182. Id. The Fasano court said, "[a]t this juncture we feel we would be ignoring reality to rigidly
view all zoning decisions by local governing bodies as legislative acts to be accorded a full presumption of validity and shielded from less than constitutional scrutiny." Id.
183. Id. At this point in the opinion, the Fasano court referred to Illinois Supreme Court Justice
Klingbiel's concurrence in Ward v. Village of Skokie, 186 N.E.2d 529 (Ill. 1962). Fasano, 507 P.2d at
26. In Ward, the Village of Skokie, located in suburban Chicago, refused to grant a special permit to
landowners desiring to build a motel on their property. Ward, 186 N.E.2d at 529. The majority agreed
with the lower court, and held that the application of the ordinance as applied to the specific property
was arbitrary and unconstitutional. Id. at 530-31. Although concurring in the result, Justice Klingbiel

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 5 [1993], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

the functional analysis, the Fasano court distinguished legislative from
judicial acts:
"Basically, this test involves the determination of whether action
produces a general rule or policy which is applicable to an open
class of individuals, interest[s], or situations, or whether it entails
the application of a general rule or policy to specific individuals,
interests, or situations. If the former determination is satisfied,
there is legislative action;
if the latter determination is satisfied,
' 84
the action is judicial."'
Using this approach, the Fasano court stated that when the county commissioners passed the original ordinance, they produced a rule of law
applicable to any and all county residents who lived in a zoned area.85
and thus acted in an open-ended or legislative capacity.' 86 However, by
applying the ordinance and rezoning a "specific piece of property," the
commission acted judicially.'87 Therefore, the court concluded that site88
specific rezoning was a judicial, as opposed to a legislative, function.
Given this characterization of site-specific rezoning decisions, the
Fasano court then addressed the second issue: the standard of review and
burden of proof for such decisions. 89 The court first noted that because
site-specific rezonings were judicial acts, the limitations on judicial review
of legislative acts, and specifically the fairly debatable rule, should not apply."9 In defining a more restrictive standard of review, the Fasano

attacked the court's reliance upon the traditional legislative approach:
It is not a part of the legislative function to grant permits ... or decide particular cases.
Such activities are not legislative but . . . judicial in character. To place them in the hands
of legislative bodies, whose acts as such are not judicially reviewable, is to open the door
completely to arbitrary government. I need not dwell at length on the obvious opportunity
this affords for special privilege, for the granting of favors to political friends or financial
benefactors... and so on.
Id. at 533 (Klingbiel, J., concurring). Contrary to Fasano, the Ward court, as recognized by Justice
Klingbiel but not the Ward majority, was faced with the rejection of a special permit and not a rezoning decision. Id. at 531 (Klingbiel, J., concurring). Courts have traditionally viewed the granting of
special permits, variances, and the like as judicial functions. See, e.g., Rural New Town. Inc. v. Palm
Beach County, 315 So. 2d 478, 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); supra note 164.
184. Fasano,507 P.2d at 27 (quoting Holman, supra note 17, at 137).
185. Id. at 26-27. In fact, the zoning ordinance in Fasanowas a "floating zone." Id. at 25, 28. A
floating zone is an ordinance which creates a new classification of property but does not place that
zone on the zoning map until its subsequent approval at a specific location. Id. at 25. Thus, when
passed, this ordinance was not actually applicable to anyone at all.
186. See id. at 26.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 27-30.
190. Id. at 27 ("We reject the proposition that judicial review of the county commissioners' deter-
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court focused upon the relationship between zoning and planning.' The
court looked to the Oregon planning statute and found that it effectively

conditioned zoning ordinances upon their consistency with the comprehensive plan.192 Thus, the court substituted a consistency analysis for the arbitrary and capricious analysis previously used for site-specific rezoning
ordinances.'93
Additionally, the Fasano court held that because site-specific
rezonings are judicial, the party seeking the rezoning has the burden to
show both the necessity of the zoning change and its consistency with the
comprehensive plan.194 Such a burden would increase as the overall impact of the change increases, making it harder for cities to enact radical

zoning changes without substantial evidence of public need. 95 Thus,
Fasano launched the trend to reclassify site-specific rezonings as judicial
actions and induced the erosion of the fairly debatable rule.'96

mination to change the zoning of the particular property in question is limited to a determination
whether the change was arbitrary and capricious.").
191. Id.
192. Id. at 28.
193. Id. The Faganocourt established a two-step approach for consistency. Id. First, proof of consistency with a comprehensive plan should contain evidence of a public need for the change. Id. Second, the need must "be best served" by the classification change. Id. However, the Fasano court did
not clearly describe the amount of evidence needed to show consistency. See id. at 27-30. Some courts
have classified this quantum as requiring substantial competent evidence, while others have used a preponderance or even a clear and convincing standard. See 1 ANDERSON, supra note 2, §§ 3.20-.21.
194. Fasano, 507 P.2d at 28-29. Under the legislative view of rezonings, the party challenging the
rezoning had the burden of proof to show that the change was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious. See St. Petersburg v. Aikin, 217 So. 2d 315, 316 (Fla. 1968).
195. Fasano,507 P.2d at 29 & n.3. The court also addressed the question of procedural due process by forbidding all ex parte contacts with the decisionmakers. Id. at 30. However, this provision
was expressly overruled by state statute. See OR. REV. STAT. § 215.4221(3) (1993).
196. Fasano has been generally followed in Oregon and other jurisdictions, including Florida. See
Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 542 P.2d 371, 373-76 (Colo. 1975) (en banc); Machado v. Musgrove,
519 So. 2d 629 (3d DCA 1987), rev. denied, 529 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 1988); Cooper v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 614 P.2d 947, 949-51 (Idaho 1980); Green v. Hayward, 552 P.2d 815, 820-21 (Or. 1976);
Greb v. Board of Comm'rs, 573 P.2d 733, 735 (Or. Ct. App. 1978); South Cent. Ass'n of Neighbors
v. Lindsey, 535 P.2d 1381, 1382 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (applying Fasano to city zoning boards);
Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 573 P.2d 359, 365 (Wash. 1978) (en banc). However, some courts have
rejected all or part of the Fasano approach. See Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722, 725 (Or.
1980) (overruling prohibition of ex parte contacts); Knowles v. City of Aiken, 407 S.E.2d 639, 642
(S.C. 1991) (retaining the fairly debatable standard and finding that rezoning is a legislative act);
Hampton v. Richland County, 357 S.E.2d 463, 466-67 (Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting Fasano), cert. dismissed, 370 S.E.2d 714, 715 (S.C. 1988) (limiting rejection of Fasano to dictum); Quinn v. Town of
Dodgeville, 354 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting Fasano), af'd, 364 N.W.2d 149 (Wis.
1985); McGann v. City Council, 581 P.2d 1104, 1107 (Wyo. 1978) (holding zoning and rezoning
decisions to be legislative acts). Additionally, Fasano's prohibition of ex parte contacts was overruled
by statute. See OR. REv. STAT. § 215.4221(3) (1993).
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3. Judicial Treatment of Site-Specific Rezonings in Florida
Many jurisdictions which had taken the legislative view of site-specific
rezonings began to reexamine their own law vis- -vis the Fasanorezoning
analysis.'97 However, the application of the functional approach in Florida has neither been clear nor uniform. 9 In order to successfully untangle Florida's treatment of site-specific rezonings in the post-Fasano
era, 199 an initial look at Florida caselaw on a district-by-district basis
may be helpful.
In what may have been Florida's clearest approach to rezoning law,
the First District Court of Appeal took the traditional legislative view of
site-specific rezonings. °° For example, in City of Jacksonville v.
Grubbs,2 °' the court stated that the aggrieved party had the burden to
prove, under the traditional fairly debatable standard, that the decision was
not related to the "health, safety, welfare and morals of the community." 2 2 Generally, the First District refused to accept either the theoretical
basis of the functional approach, or its application to rezonings." 3 Thus,
the First District firmly supported the view that site-specific rezonings are
legislative and applied the fairly debatable standard of judicial review.
Likewise, the Second District also accepted the legislative approach;
however, it often failed to use the same standard or method of judicial
review as the First District.21 In City of Tampa v. Speth," 5 the court
197. See authorities cited supra note 196 (approving Fasano).
198. See, e.g., infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
199. Although Oregon enacted its mandatory comprehensive planning statute before the Fasano
opinion was written in 1973, see Fasano, 507 P.2d at 27, Florida did not enact LGCPA until 1975.
See supra note 52. Thus, this analysis will only include decisions promulgated after the enactment of
LGCPA. Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 595 So. 2d 65 (5th DCA 1991), quashed, 627 So. 2d
469 (Fla. 1993), and caselaw subsequent to it will be discussed in the next section.
200. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Monticello Drug Co., 619 So. 2d 361, 365 (1st DCA
1993), quashed sub nom. O'Connor Dev. Corp. v. Leon County, 630 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1994); City of
Jacksonville Beach v. Grubbs, 461 So. 2d 160, 162-63 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), overruled in part by
Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 476; Town of Orange Park v. Pope, 459 So. 2d 418, 420-21 (Fla. IstDCA
1984).
201. 461 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), overruled in part by Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 476. In
Grubbs, the City of Jacksonville Beach denied a request to rezone seven lots from single-family residential to duplex. Id. at 161.
202. Id. at 163. The Grubbs court also expressed this standard in terms of "depriv[ing] the property of all beneficial use," id. at 162, but this language merely refers to the fact that this standard is also
a test of constitutionality. See supra note 106.
203. Monticello Drug, 619 So. 2d at 365 (declining to adopt the Fasano approach).
204. See Hirt v. Polk County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 578 So. 2d 415, 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
(stating in dictum that "creating zoning districts and rezoning land are legislative actions, and ...
courts are not permitted to sit as 'super zoning boards' and overturn a board's legislative efforts");
City of Tampa v. Speth, 517 So. 2d 786, 786 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); City of Clearwater v. College
Properties, 239 So. 2d 515, 517-18 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970). But see Hirt, 578 So. 2d at 417 (applying the
functional approach to planned unit developments).
205. 517 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). In Speth, an owner of a parcel of land sought a zoning
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stated that the burden rests with the party seeking change to demonstrate
that the denial was "arbitrary, unreasonable, or confiscatory."" However, in Manatee County v. Kuehnel,' the Second District found that the

lower court applied the correct law when it found that no "substantial,
competent evidence" supported the county commission's decision rather

than examining whether the evidence was beyond any fair debate." 8
Thus, the Second District blurred the distinction between legislative and

judicial treatment of site-specific rezonings.2"
The Third District neatly exemplified some of the problems courts
have faced in interpreting the functional approach. Early cases took the
legislative view of site-specific rezoning and required the party appealing

such a decision to show that it was capricious, unreasonable, or arbitrary.21 But these cases also expressed the fairly debatable standard of
proof in terms of "substantial competent evidence.".2. Even though some
courts intimated that no difference existed between the two standards, the
change in terminology produced, at the very least, confusion for local
governments in interpreting and developing the law.2" 2

change from single-family to multi-family dwellings. Id. The city denied the rezoning request and the
landowner appealed. Id.
206. Id.
207. 542 So. 2d 1356 (2d DCA), rev. denied, 548 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1989). In Kuehnel, the court
allowed a landowner to appeal the denial of a county site-specific rezoning decision by writ of certiorari instead of the usual injunction. See id. at 1357; supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text. In the
reported opinion, the Kuehnel court gave no opinion as to the nature of rezonings. However, in the advance sheet opinion, Manatee County v. Kuehnel, 538 So. 2d 52, withdrawn, 542 So. 2d 1356, 1357
(Fla. 2d DCA 1989), the court held that the denial of a rezoning request was judicial rather than legislative. La Croix, supra note 14, at 105. In granting a motion for rehearing, the Second District substituted an opinion with no reference to the character of rezoning decisions. Kuehnel, 542 So. 2d at
1357-58; La Croix, supra note 14, at 105, 108 (discussing the change in the Kuehnel opinion from the
original to the revised opinion).
208. Kuehnel, 542 So. 2d at 1358.
209. Because the court failed to discuss the basis for both the substantial competent evidence
requirement and the circuit court review by certiorari, the Second District's position on rezonings remained unclear. See Gougelman, supra note 25, at 25; La Croix, supra note 14, at 105.
210. Town of Hialeah Gardens v. Hebraica Community Ctr., 309 So. 2d 212, 213-14 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1975); Hall v. Korth, 244 So. 2d 766, 769 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971).
211. E.g., Hall, 244 So. 2d at 769.
212. Although at first glance the substantial evidence standard seems stricter than the fairly debatable standard, this issue might be much ado about nothing. "Fairly" is defined as "with substantial
correctness." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 597 (6th ed. 1990). "Debatable" is defined as "open to dispute." WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1961). Thus, beyond all fair
debate could mean "substantially beyond dispute." With this possible construction of "fairly debatable," it could be argued that there is little practical difference between the two standards. Although no
Third District case has directly addressed this distinction, other district courts have interpreted the two
phrases differently. Some judges have noted an apparent difference. See Orange County v. Lust, 602
So. 2d 568, 576 (5th DCA) (W. Sharp, J., concurring), rev. denied, 613 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1992); Gilmore
v. Hernando County, 584 So. 2d 27, 30-31 (5th DCA 1991) (justifying the difference between fairly
debatable and substantial competent evidence standards), rev. denied, 598 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1992);
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Furthermore, the Third District's decisions created additional confusion at the district court level because they were premised upon ordinances
applicable only to jurisdictions inside that district." 3 For example, Dade
County, located in the Third District, enacted an ordinance which provides
various procedural due process rights for rezoning hearings. 4 In effect,
Dade County had by ordinance characterized rezonings as judicial functions.2" 5 However, reliance upon the quasi-judicial label, when taken out
of the context of the specific jurisdiction, can create inconsistency when
applied in other jurisdictions. 6 Thus, courts from other districts which
have cited to Third District cases often have failed to consider the unique
qualities of the Dade County rezoning process.2"7
Unlike the other districts, the Fourth District tried to sort out the various approaches and balance all interests involved in the rezoning process.
Although the Fourth District originally followed the traditional legislative
approach,15 it began to focus more on the question of consistency with
LGCPA in an attempt to accommodate the necessities of long-range planning. 1 9 In Southwest Ranches Homeowners Ass'n v. County of
220 the court acknowledged
Broward,
the prior use of the deferential fairly

Battaglia Fruit Co. v. City of Maitland, 530 So. 2d 940, 951 (5th DCA) (Sharp, C.J., dissenting)
(same), cause dismissed, 537 So. 2d 568, 569 (Fla. 1988). On the contrary, some decisions implicitly
treat both standards equally. See Lee County v. Sunbelt Equities, II, 619 So. 2d 996, 1006 n.13 (Fla.
2d DCA 1993) (stating that substantial means reasonable and competent means relevant); St. Johns
County v. Owings, 554 So. 2d 535, 544-45 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). Additionally, some courts have
explicitly equated a ruling beyond all fair debate with one that meets substantial competent evidence.
Lust, 602 So. 2d at 570; Town of Indialantic v. Nance, 400 So. 2d 37, 40 (5th DCA 1981), approved
by 419 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 1982).
213. Gougelman, supra note 25, at 25.
214. Coral Reef Nurseries v. Babcock Co., 410 So. 2d 648, 652-53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). But the
Coral Reef court added in dictum that, in determining the application of res judicata effects, a zoning
hearing conducted without due process guarantees is legislative in nature. Id. at 653 n. 10. Nonetheless,
other courts can easily misconstrue such a statement to mean that any hearing which gives notice, an
opportunity to be heard, and the ability to present and question witnesses is judicial and not subject to
the fairly debatable rule.
215. Id.
216. See Gougelman, supra note 25, at 25.
217. See, e.g., Hirt, 578 So. 2d at 416 (citing Sun Ray Homes v. County of Dade, 166 So. 2d 827,
829 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)).
218. See Broward County v. Capeletti Bros., 375 So. 2d 313, 315 (4th DCA 1979), cert. denied,
385 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 1980); Rural New Town, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 315 So. 2d 478, 479-80
(Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (using the fairly debatable standard which could be rebutted by competent substantial evidence).
219. See Lincoln, supra note 31, at 363-65 (discussing the Fourth District's reaction to the
LGCPA).
220. 502 So. 2d 931 (4th DCA), rev. denied, 511 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1987). A homeowners association sought to enjoin the county from rezoning property to permit construction of a landfill. Id. at 933.
The Association argued that judicial review of rezoning decisions ought to consider the rezoning's
consistency with the comprehensive plan according to a preponderance standard of evidence. See
Appellant's Initial Brief at 15, Southwest Ranches (No. 4-86-0208). The county replied that the fairly
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debatable rule." But it also recognized that the legislature clearly contemplated "intelligent, uniform growth" in enacting LGCPA.222 To ensure compatibility with this statutory system, the court placed a consistency analysis' on top of the deferential fairly debatable test. 4 Thus, the

Southwest Ranches court created a judicial review scheme which focused
upon the statutory consistency requirement rather than the function of the
rezoning process.'
Finally, the Fifth District best exemplified the reigning intradistrict

confusion as to the correct standard for judicial review of site-specific
rezonings. Like the other districts, the Fifth District had originally stated
that rezonings were legislative functions and that the traditional fairly
debatable standard applied." 6 But dissenting judges began to question
the validity of the deferential view because it often ignored the issue of
consistency with LGCPA. 7 Later decisions held, without addressing the

issue of consistency with a general plan, that rezonings were judicial proceedings." Even after this change, at least one Fifth District opinion
debatable rule was still valid, even with respect to the consistency question. Answer Brief of Appellee
at 24, Southwest Ranches (No. 4-86-0208) (citing Dade County v. Inversiones Rafamar, S.A., 360 So.
2d 1130, 1132-33 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)). Thus, the Southwest Ranches court was faced with defining
the role of LGCPA in judicial review of rezonings, an issue upon which sister courts widely disagreed.
See Lincoln, supra note 31, at 363-65 (discussing Florida courts' reaction to the LGCPA).
221. Southwest Ranches, 502 So. 2d at 935-36.
222. Id. at 936.
223. Id. at 936-40.
224. Id. at 936. In defining this method of judicial review, the Southwest Ranches court called for
a two-step process which adjusts according to the intensity of the proposed rezoning decision. See id.
First, a court must determine whether the proposed use is more or less intense than the plan allows.
See id. If it is less intense, the court can apply the fairly debatable standard and give the rezoning a
presumption of validity. See id. (citing Grubbs, 461 So. 2d at 162-63). When the rezoning calls for a
more intense use, a court must subject it to strict scrutiny to determine its consistency with all aspects
of the comprehensive plan. Id. at 936 (citing Grubbs, 461 So. 2d at 163 n.3). Incidentally, the term
"strict scrutiny" is not used in the constitutional sense but merely to mean a searching inquiry. See
Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 475 (Fla. 1993); Sunbelt Equities, 619 So. 2d at
1003; Machado v. Musgrove, 519 So. 2d 629, 632 (3d DCA 1987), rev. denied, 529 So. 2d 694 (Fla.
1988).
The Southwest Ranches court also called for a flexible approach to consistency which would
consider many factors, including change in population density of use, effect upon natural resources,
and the nature and goals of the proposed use. Southwest Ranches, 502 So. 2d at 938-39. But see City
of Cape Canaveral v. Mosher, 467 So. 2d 468, 471 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (Cowart, J., concurring)
(calling for a more rigid interpretation of consistency to preclude any deviation from the plan's density
provisions).
225. See Southwest Ranches, 502 So. 2d at 935-36. However, at least one court has been reluctant
to follow this seemingly well-reasoned approach. See Machado, 519 So. 2d at 633 & n.3 (rejecting
Southwest Ranches' view of consistency).
226. Owings, 554 So. 2d at 537; City of New Smyrna Beach v. Barton, 414 So. 2d 542, 543 (5th
DCA) (per curiam), rev. denied, 424 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1982).
227. Battaglia Fruit,530 So. 2d at 950-51 (Sharp, CJ., dissenting); Mosher, 467 So. 2d at 470-71
(Cowart, J., concurring) (arguing for strict consistency with comprehensive plan).
228. City of Melbourne v. Hess Realty Corp., 575 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). Hess
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continued to classify rezonings as legislative decisions, prompting one
judge to call for direct supreme court intervention. 29 With this inability
to develop a single standard of rezoning review both between and within
appellate districts, it was only a matter of time before the Florida Supreme
Court stepped in to clarify the state of the law.
C. Snyder: The FloridaSupreme Court's Application
of the FunctionalApproach
1. The Fifth District Decision
By 1991, the Fifth District still had not developed a unitary policy of
judicial review with respect to site-specific rezonings. However, in Snyder
v. Board of County Commissioners,3 ' the appellate court attempted to
resolve the disparity within the district's rezoning law. In Snyder, owners
of a one-half-acre piece of land requested the Brevard County Board to rezone their property from general use to medium-density multiple-family
dwelling use. 3' Although a planning commission approved the change,
the Board of Commissioners overruled that decision without stating its
reason. 2 The landowners filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the
circuit court denied and affirmed the Board's refusal to rezone.233 The
property owners then appealed to the Fifth District, claiming that the
Board unreasonably denied their application for rezoning. 2 4 The Board
argued that the rezoning decision was legislative in nature and should not
be overturned unless unreasonable beyond all fair debate. 35
In a lengthy opinion, the Fifth District employed a variation of the
Fasano functional approach -36 to rezonings and found all site-specific
rezonings to be judicial acts. 37 In so holding, the Snyder court relied upon the traditional tests of a judicial function-namely, action which affects
relies predominately on the argument that rezonings are judicial because of their due process requirements. Id. at 775 & n.1.
229. Lust, 602 So. 2d at 576.
230. 595 So. 2d 65 (5th DCA 1991), quashed, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
231. Id. at 66-67.
232. Id. at 67-68.
233. Id. at 68.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See id. at 77 (citing Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23, 26-30 (1973), overruled in part by Neuberger v. City of Portland, 607 P.2d 722, 725 (Or. 1980)).
237. Id. at 79-80. The Snyder court effectively distinguished between site-specific rezonings and
non-site-specific rezonings. See id. at 74. By implication, the court seemed to say that non-site-specific
rezonings would be a legislative action. Id. at 79-80 ('The application of a fairly debatable, or for that
matter, any other deferential or discretionary standard, is not the correct standard of judicial review
where the issue and decision involves the proper application of a legislated rule of law to a particular
piece of property."). But see supra note 170.
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a small number of people instead of a large class, action which applies a
rule of law instead of formulating one, and action which acts retrospectively instead of prospectively." Thus, the Snyder court reemphasized
the use of the functional analysis to deny site-specific rezonings the benefit of judicial deferenceY 9
To further justify this point, the Snyder court argued that the legislative approach does not correctly reflect the realities of present-day zoning

laws.'

°

The court found that, by making local zoning decisions subser-

vient to mandatory planning directives, the legislature limited the scope of
" ' The court
zoning power to achieve consistency with long-term goals.24
also mandated increased procedural regulation of rezonings in order to
eliminate "favoritism, abuses and inconsistencies" inherent in site-specific
rezoning decisions.- Thus, the Snyder court determined that the exigencies of current land use law and the realities of political abuse obligated

the court to classify site-specific rezonings as judicial rather than legislative functions.243
Once the court attached the functional label, it then turned to the correct standard of review and burden of proof. The court noted that while
some courts have struck a balance between heightened consistency review
and judicial deference,2' other courts, including Fasano, have adopted

complete scrutiny of local rezoning actions.245 In approving of Fasano,
the Snyder court adopted a method of classifying zoning decisions similar
to Fasano but unlike any other developed by Florida courts.246 The
Snyder court required that the landowner initially present a prima facie

238. Snyder, 595 So. 2d at 78; see also supra text accompanying notes 157-65 (differentiating
between legislative and judicial action).
239. Snyder, 595 So. 2d at 78.
240. Id. at 75.
241. See id.; accord Machado, 519 So. 2d at 632. However, this statement seems to misconstrue
or contradict the legislative intent of LGCPA. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3161(8) (1993) ("It is the intent
of the Legislature that [repeal of existing planning legislation in favor of LGCPA amendments] shall
not be interpreted to limit or restrict the powers of municipal or county officials, but shall be interpreted as a recognition of their broad statutory and constitutional powers to plan for and regulate the use
of land.").
242. Snyder, 595 So. 2d at 76. An example of this is the doctrine of "spot zoning." See id. Spot
zoning has been defined generally as a zoning amendment that singles out a small parcel of land for a
use classification different than the surrounding area. Southwest Ranches, 502 So. 2d at 935. See generally John B. Kirkpatrick & Laura G. Schoenfeld, Spot Zoning and the Domino Effect, 17
WESTCHESTER B.J. 133 (1990) (discussing spot zoning). Spot zoning is usually struck down as an
invalid zoning practice. Id.
243. Snyder, 595 So. 2d at 78.
244. Id. at 75-76; see also Southwest Ranches, 502 So. 2d at 935-36 (balancing strict scrutiny and
deferential standards); Grubbs, 461 So. 2d at 163 & n.3 (same).
245. Snyder, 595 So. 2d at 77-78 (citing Fasano, 507 P.2d at 26-30); see also Machado, 519 So.
2d at 632 (using strict judicial scrutiny, but not applying a judicial label to rezoning proceedings).
246. See Snyder, 595 So. 2d at 80.
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showing that the rezoning sought conforms with the comprehensive
plan.2 47 A landowner who meets this test is presumptively entitled to this
use;248 however, the burden then shifts to the local zoning agency to
show by clear and convincing evidence that public necessity requires a
more restrictive use.249 Finally, if the local zoning agency meets its bur-

den, the landowner can then show that the permitted restrictive use creates
a compensable taking."'
The Snyder court also clarified its definition of consistency with the
comprehensive plan. The court stated that individuals have a constitutional
right to own and use property to its maximum potential, and any attempt
to limit that right "triggers constitutional protections." '' Additionally,
the court noted that site-specific rezonings typically inhibit usage of property and serve various political motivations.252 To avoid unnecessary limitations upon the fundamental right of property ownership, the court implied that the law should favor landowners and permit them to use their
property in any way permitted by the comprehensive plan. 53 While other
courts have allowed cities to downzone property,254 Snyder severely restricted municipalities from engaging in such practices. 55 Thus, the court
gave wide latitude for landowners to request increased use intensities of
property, up to the use allowed by the comprehensive plan, absent clear
and convincing evidence that "public necessity" warrants a different re25 6

sult.

Finally, the Snyder court established procedural standards for sitespecific rezoning decisions. The court held that to meet the clear and
convincing burden of proof, a municipality must provide evidence that its

247. Id. at 81.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 81 & n.70. The Fifth District virtually created the clear and convincing standard of
evidence out of thin air by implicitly comparing government rezoning actions to termination of parental rights, termination of life support, declarations of personal incompetency, infringement upon First
Amendment rights, and adverse possession. Id. In doing so, the Fifth District made the assumption that
every decision to rezone is a potential infringement upon constitutionally protected property rights. See
id. One possible ramification of this assumption is that every contested rezoning could become a constitutional issue.
250. Id. at 81.
251. Id. at 70.
252. Id. at 73-74.
253. See id. at 81.
254. See Grubbs, 461 So. 2d at 162, 163 n.3. "Downzoning" means establishing zoning intensities
less than that permitted by the comprehensive plan. Id. at 162-63; Peckinpaugh, supra note 11,at 502
n.26. Such policies allow cities to create buffer zones between high intensities of use or to gradually
develop property toward a future goal. See Grubbs, 461 So. 2d at 161, 163; supra part II.C.
255. Snyder, 595 So. 2d at 81 & n.68. But see Grubbs, 461 So. 2d at 162 (rejecting necessity to
rezone for merely the "highest and best use" of property).
256. Snyder, 595 So. 2d at 81.
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decision was justifiable."s? To do this, the municipality must keep a record of its proceedings in which it states detailed findings of fact, applicable law, and the rationale for the action taken."5 A court would then
subject this record to exacting judicial scrutiny. 9 Additionally, parties
protesting the Board's action must have a verbatim record of the rezoning
hearing.'W Thus, Snyder required cities to follow strict procedural pol" '
icies at rezoning hearings.26
2. The Supreme Court Decision
In light of Snyder's apparent conflict with other Florida law262 on the
standard and method of review for site-specific rezonings, the Board appealed the Fifth District's opinion to the Florida Supreme Court. 3 First,
the supreme court affirmed the lower court's use of the functional analysis
to determine that site-specific rezonings were judicial in character.2" The
supreme court found that when a local board applies a general rule of law

to a limited class of persons, this creates judicial rather than legislative action.265 Thus, as a judicial act, petition by writ of certiorari was a proper
means of review of the rezoning decision."
Turning to the standard of review, the supreme court analyzed the
novel standard of review created by the district court.267 At the outset,
the court recognized that the use of the fairly debatable standard with sitespecific rezonings created many of the zoning problems that LGCPA was
designed to reform.268 In finding the deferential approach inadequate to

257. Id. at 80-81.
258. Id. at 81.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 80; see also Battaglia Fruit Co. v. City of Maitland, 530 So. 2d 940, 943 (5th DCA)
(implying that preservation of standing to sue was based on the precondition of making a record at the
hearing), cause dismissed, 537 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1988); Gougelman, supra note 25, at 27.
261. See Gougelman, supra note 25, at 27.
262. This decision conflicted with a significant number of Florida cases. E.g., Schauer v. City of
Miami Beach, 112 So. 2d 838, 839-40 (Fla. 1959); Palm Beach County v. Tinnerman, 517 So. 2d 699,
699-700 (4th DCA 1987), rev. denied, 528 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 1988); Southwest Ranches, 502 So. 2d at
935-36; Grubbs, 461 So. 2d at 163.
263. Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 472 (Fla. 1993).
264. Id. at 474-75.
265. Id. at 474.
266. Id. at 474-75. However, at least one commentator has questioned the use of certiorari review
for rezonings. See Lincoln, supra note 31, at 380 ("While some courts apparently accept certiorari
review of zoning issues under special acts which originally established particular zoning ordinances,
this is invalid.") (footnote omitted).
267. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 475.
268. See id. at 472-73. Specifically, the court pointed to irregular development of zoning strategy,
negative political and self-interested influences upon local decisionmaking, and thoughtless, ad hoc
decisionmaking. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

33

Florida Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 5 [1993], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

uphold the mandatory consistency requirement of LGCPA, the court approved the lower court's acceptance of a strict scrutiny analysis for smallscale rezonings.269
Although the court generally agreed with the Fifth District that sitespecific rezonings should be subject to stricter review, it quickly departed
from the rest of the opinion.27 ° The court found that the Fifth District's
strict intensity approach denied local government the ability to develop
land at an incremental and orderly pace.2 1 The court stated that local
governments should be able to regulate the rate at which land development
occurs.2 12 As long as the city's action supports a use which is within the
maximum limits specified by the comprehensive plan, it does not have to
allow a more intense, albeit consistent, use.2 3 Thus, the court approved
of the flexible consistency approach taken by the First and Fourth Dis4
tricts.

27

Furthermore, the court disagreed with the Fifth District's exacting
standard of review and its double-shifting burden of proof. The court
stated:
[W]e hold that a landowner seeking to rezone property has the
burden of proving that the proposal is consistent with the comprehensive plan and complies with all procedural requirements of the
zoning ordinance. At this point, the burden shifts to the governmental board to demonstrate that maintaining the existing zoning
classification ... is not arbitrary, discriminatory, or unreasonable.
If the board carries its burden, the application should be denied.275

269. See id. at 473-75.
270. Id. at 475.
271. Id. The supreme court stated, using the words of the Oregon Court of Appeals:
"[A] comprehensive plan only establishes a long-range maximum limit on the possible intensity of land use; a plan does not simultaneously establish an immediate minimum limit
on the possible intensity of land use. The present use of land may, by zoning ordinance,
continue to be more limited than the future use contemplated by the comprehensive plan."
Id. (quoting Marracci v. City of Scappoose, 552 P.2d 552, 553 (Or. Ct. App. 1976)). Orderly development of land is also an integral part of LGCPA. FLA. STAT. § 163.3161(7) (1993).
272. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 475.
273. Id. However, the court disapproved Grubbs insofar as it applied the fairly debatable standard
to site-specific rezonings. See id. at 476.
274. Compare id. at 475 (providing that local governments should be flexible to "decide that the
maximum development density should not be allowed") with Southwest Ranches, 502 So. 2d at 936
(reading Grubbs to require consistency, but only using strict scrutiny to examine property use more
intense than the comprehensive plan) and Grubbs, 461 So. 2d at 162, 163 & n.3 (requiring consistency
to mean uses less intense than the comprehensive plan).
275. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 476.
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According to this holding, the landowner has the initial burden of-proving
that a proposal is consistent with the comprehensive plan.276 Upon meeting that burden, the zoning board could still deny the rezoning petition if
it could show by substantial, competent evidence that such a refusal is not
unconstitutional." In enunciating this standard, the court refused to apply increased judicial scrutiny to ease the burden upon a landowner contesting a site-specific rezoning decision." 8 Thus, the court applied an
equal measure of proof for both parties but placed the initial burden upon
the challenging party.279
Finally, the supreme court reversed the Fifth District's requirement
that zoning boards make specific findings of fact."o Nonetheless, the
board still must produce to the reviewing circuit court substantial, competent evidence to support its decisions." On appellate review, the supreme court stated that the district court may only determine if the circuit
court 2 guaranteed procedural due process and applied the proper rule of
28
law.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SNYDER FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
APPLICATION TO SITE-SPECIFIC REZONING IN FLORIDA

Since its introduction in Fasano, courts have attempted to use the
functional approach to reform the law of site-specific rezonings.283 However, even supporters of the functional approach admit that its line-drawing methodology is not always conclusive. 2" Although such reform is
desirable and necessary,' the analysis applies a rigid and formalistic set
of judicial rules to an inherently nonjudicial system. In doing so, the functional approach alienates citizens from their elected representatives and
takes away one of the last vestiges of democratic participation. Additionally, the application of the functional analysis by Florida courts has produced some disastrous effects upon the very system it sought to improve.

276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See Id.
279. See id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. (citing City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1982)).
283. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
284. Lee County v. Sunbelt Equities, II, 619 So. 2d 996, 1000 n.5 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Booth,
supra note 11, at 768; Holman, supra note 17, at 134.
285. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
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A. Critique of the Functional Approach Theory
As developed and implemented, the functional analysis attempts to
distinguish between legislative and judicial acts by relying on a set of
norms that describes how each branch of government operates."a The
first norm of the functional approach states that legislatures create general
law and judicial bodies apply law.287 Admittedly, this distinction works
well when differentiating between the activities of legislatures and
courts. 8 However, local agencies, such as zoning boards or county commissions, often perform both lawmaking and law-applying duties at the
same time. For example, when a county commission passes an ordinance
to amend the allotted uses of a previously-created zoning district,289 it
not only creates a new law but also applies the law to property and those
who own it. Thus, such action contains both legislative and judicial qualities. Concededly, the functional approach does not rely on this test alone
to determine the classification of rezoning actions.2"' However, the problems of this first norm of the functional approach demonstrate the inherent
difficulty in placing functional labels on local decisionmaking processes.
The next functional approach norm asks whether the action is prospective or retrospective in vision.29' This also creates definitional difficulties. Courts and local bodies that are supposedly judicial often act with an
eye open to future ramifications of their decisions.292 For instance, courts
will often grant injunctive relief to ward off harm that they believe will
occur in the future.293 Such a remedy, however, requires the court to focus on the prospective result of granting or denying injunctive relief to not

286. See supra notes 151-66 and accompanying text. Some commentators also have claimed that
legislatures act with a large amount of discretion, while courts are more confined to rules of law. See
Booth, supra note 11, at 768. Courts have stated that an administrative act is judicial if notice and
opportunity to be heard are required. See De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 915 (Fla. 1957); Harris
v. Goff, 151 So. 2d 642, 643 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963).
287. See Holman, supra note 17, at 134-35; supra text accompanying notes 157-58.
288. See Holman, supra note 17, at 135 ("Normally, this dichotomy will see the legislative body
passing a law and the judicial body applying it.").
289. Most Florida courts would consider the initial zoning decision a purely legislative process.
See, e.g., Schauer v. City of Miami Beach, 112 So. 2d 838, 839 (Fla. 1959).
290. See Holman, supra note 17, at 134-36.
291. See id. at 134-35; supra text accompanying note 161.
292. Courts often use forward-looking arguments in balancing the equities of a particular case. For
example, the slippery slope argument will allow a court to ignore otherwise compelling facts in order
to avoid setting an undesirable precedent for other cases. See Office of State Attorney v. Parrotino,
628 So. 2d 1097, 1100 (Fla. 1993) ("[W]e cannot allow sympathy in one instance to establish precedent that would overturn a well founded and long-standing [doctrine] .. "); see also infra notes 29394 and accompanying text (discussing injunctions as a type of forward-looking judicial action); cf
infra note 295 and accompanying text (noting that legislatures also view the future effects of action).
293. See American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prods., 780 F.2d 589, 593-94 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner, J.).
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only the parties at bar, but to the general public as well.2" Also, legislatures often act both prospectively and retrospectively in considering the
merits of reform legislation.295 Thus, the forward- or backward-looking

characteristics of an action do not present a clear indicator of its judicial
or legislative nature.
Even if these inconsistencies could be perceived as negligible, the
major flaw in the functional approach lies in the reliance on the scope of

an action to determine whether it is judicial or legislative in

function.296

This "scope analysis" states that legislative decisions affect a large area of

land or a broad class of individuals or interests, while judicial acts affect a
minor portion of property or a limited number of persons.297 Like all

amorphous line-drawing tests, the main issue is determining what size
property will be minor and how many interests or parties will be considered a limited number. 8 Such distinctions could vary depending on the
size and population of the particular jurisdiction involved.2 Furthermore, all rezoning decisions, even those that touch and concern small
parcels of land, arguably affect larger areas of property and their owners.3" What one landowner wants to do with a piece of property may
alter the use and property value of other land, as well as the goals of the

comprehensive plan.3"' Thus, any rezoning decision could potentially affect identifiable property and interests on a wide scale.
Given the uncertainty of the theory behind this test, courts would

294. Id. The example of a court's equity jurisdiction can also be used to argue against the use of
discretion as an element of the functional approach, see Holman, supra note 17, at 136, because courts
applying equity jurisdiction rely less on principles of law and more on principles of fairness. Carmen
v. Fox Film Corp., 269 F. 928, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 255 U.S. 569 (1921).
295. See Ralph F. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARV. L. REv. 259, 262
(1938).
296. See Holman, supra note 17, at 134-35, 136 & n.61; supra notes 163-64 and accompanying
text. The existence of such a defect in this part of the functional approach would severely undermine
its validity because the scope of a decision's application has been a significant element in many formulations of the functional test. See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474; Fasano, 507 P.2d at 26-27; Holman,
supra note 17, at 136 n.59.
297. Holman, supra note 17, at 137.
298. Interestingly, Michael Holman states that "major changes to the zoning map are... the product of legislative action." Holman, supra note 17, at 136 (footnote omitted). In a footnote, he defines
"major" as "20 or more acres." Id. at 136 n.61.
299. For instance, a court located in a metropolitan city with several million people may consider
25 owners of a parcel limited, while that same group might represent a major interest in a rural town
of 1000 people. The same definitional variance could exist, for example, between cities in Florida the
size of Jacksonville and Cedar Key.
300. But see Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474 (quoting Snyder, 595 So. 2d at 78) (distinguishing between
comprehensive and site-specific rezonings in terms of "impact on a limited number of persons or property owners").
301. Cf. 1 ANDERSON, supra note 2, §§ 3.03, 7.15 (discussing the effect of common law nuisances
on neighboring property).
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likely develop inconsistent conclusions based on varying views of minor
size and limited interest." 2 Moreover, as this approach makes the law
more unpredictable, local governments would have difficulty in accurately
deciding whether their own acts are legislative or judicial decisions."'
Because this decision affects a multitude of procedural and substantive issues, 304 cities could face potential litigation for every rezoning decision
they make.
B. Critique of the FunctionalApproach Application
Notwithstanding the theoretical flaws in the functional approach, its
application to site-specific rezonings does more harm than good. In
Snyder, the supreme court used the functional approach in combination
with LGCPA's consistency doctrine to construct a workable standard of
judicial review.3 5 However, the court failed to resolve other issues of the
functional analysis. Because of the overwhelming difficulties that arise
when courts attach the quasi-judicial label to site-specific rezonings, the
functional approach provides only a very limited answer to site-specific
rezoning problems.
1. Judicial Review
Given that Florida has adopted the substantial competent evidence
standard for appellate review of judicial acts,3° Snyder's holding that
site-specific rezonings are judicial functions modifies the standard of review for those decisions.3 7 In changing to a stricter standard of review,
the functional approach provides a two-fold remedial effect on site-specific
rezoning procedure. First, the Snyder decision brings more uniformity and
predictability to the law of rezonings. Before Snyder, courts would implement the fairly debatable rule,3" 8 the substantial competent evidence
rule,'3° or a mixture of both rules.3"' Cities were often unable to deter302. In fact, this has already happened in Oregon. See Gougelman, supra note 25, at 26, 30 n.13
and cases cited therein.
303. This unpredictability may also foster increased arbitrariness both at the local and judicial
levels, despite the functional approach's goal to lessen the variability in local zoning decisions.
304. See supra notes 128-39 and accompanying text.
305. See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474-76.
306. See De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 916 (Fla. 1957).
307. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 476. At the outset of this analysis, it is important to point out that the
Snyder opinion appears only to address owner-initiated, site-specific rezonings. See id. at 475. Thus,
the state of the law for similar county-initiated rezonings may still be unsettled.
308. Board of County Comm'rs v. Monticello Drug Co., 619 So. 2d 361, 365 (1st DCA 1993),
quashed sub nom. O'Connor Dev. Corp. v. Leon County, 630 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1994) (remanding with
instructions to consider in light of Snyder).
309. Sunbelt Equities, 619 So. 2d at 1008.
310. Southwest Ranches Homeowners Ass'n v. County of Broward, 502 So. 2d 931, 936, 939-40
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mine how to support their decisions made during rezoning hearings and
practitioners wondered how to initiate lawsuits when disputes arose.3 '

However, cites and landowners alike must now present substantial competent evidence to prove that rezoning decisions are legitimate.3" 2 In this

respect, the supreme court has produced a reasonably uniform measure of
judicial review for site-specific rezonings, which may help all parties to
either avoid or prepare for litigation.

Second, the judicial approach to site-specific rezonings hastens reform
of land use law by strengthening the standard of appellate review in many
jurisdictions. By moving away from the deferential fairly debatable test
and to the stricter substantial competent evidence standard, the supreme
court required more judicial scrutiny of site-specific rezonings 33 In par-

ticular, a reviewing court has to carefully determine whether the rezoning
is consistent with a comprehensive plan and whether it meets a legitimate
public purpose." 4 Thus, cities must now present substantial competent
evidence, based on testimony presented at the zoning hearing, to justify

that the site-specific rezoning is not arbitrary, discriminatory, or unreasonable. Under the Snyder standard, courts can ensure that rezoning measures
315

have a substantial relationship to public good rather than private greed.

In addition, courts will be better equipped to ferret out decisions made
with discriminatory animus. Thus, Snyder attempts to alleviate some of the

widely-recognized problems in site-specific rezoning by giving courts
more leverage to overturn local decisions.3" 6

On the contrary, local governments may claim that, given the realities
of lengthy zoning agendas and the need to hear all interests concerned,

(4th DCA), rev. denied, 511 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1987).
311. See La Croix, supra note 14, at 105. With all the confusion as to rezoning litigation, some
attorneys initiated hybrid suits, which combined a count for injunctive relief and a count seeking writ
of certiorari. Id.
312. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 475. Although the Snyder court clearly states the amount of proof that
local zoning bodies must provide to sustain their decisions, it does not make a clear statement of the
landowner's initial burden of proof. See id. at 475-76. However, the Snyder court implies that this
standard should also be at the substantial competent evidence level by requiring that a rezoning
applicant's request for change "will be subject to ... 'strict scrutiny.' "Id. at 475-76 (quoting Sunbelt
Equities, 619 So. 2d at 1005-06). The substantial competent evidence standard is an integral part of the
Snyder strict scrutiny analysis. Id. at 476.
313. Id. at 472, 475-76. Some courts might construe substantial and competent to mean virtually
the same thing as fairly debatable. See supra note 212. But see Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 472, 474-76
(discussing fairly debatable and substantial competent evidence rules as apparently requiring different
levels of scrutiny).
314. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 476. Legitimate public purpose is synonymous with pertaining to
health, morals, safety, or general welfare. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
315. See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 475-76.'
316. See id. at 472-73, 475-76 (discussing problems in site-specific zoning and enunciating new
review procedures).
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this burden effectively hinders efficient local action." 7 Nevertheless, the
use of the judicial approach in the standard of review hampers only minimally the efficiency of zoning boards. Although Snyder requires a showing of substantial competent evidence," 8 cities can base their decision
upon facts and reports normally presented at the board meeting. While
detailed findings of fact would increase a city's chances of winning an
appeal," 9 local governments have the ultimate choice in how they gather
evidence.32 Furthermore, cities could tailor fact-collecting procedures to
the level of opposition to the proposed rezoning action.32' Therefore, the
stricter judicial standard ultimately fails to place a significant burden upon
local zoning boards.
Local governments may also argue that this stricter judicial scrutiny
prohibits them from executing flexible responses to changing conditions.
However, courts implementing the functional approach have stated that the
need to eradicate arbitrary and discriminatory rezoning decisions substantially outweighs the harm to local flexibility.322 Many commentators have
documented the growing need for reform of rezoning systems which,
fueled by the deferential standard of review, reflect political, fiscal, or
parochial interests.323 These interests often have nothing to do with proper zoning practices but merely promote individual gain and arbitrarily
create "adverse consequences."324 At this point, zoning laws designed to
protect the public from the harmful effects of haphazard development
would serve only private economic or political interests. Therefore, to
avoid these consequences, courts have used the functional approach to
prioritize increased judicial scrutiny over local government convenience
2
and legislative discretion. 1
In effect, the Snyder court uses the functional approach to create an
innovative scheme of judicial review. The Snyder system combines an

317. See Gougelman, supra note 25, at 27.
318. See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 475-76.
319. Cf. Gougelman, supra note 25, at 28 (discussing the need for findings of fact under Snyder).
320. See Town of Ponce Inlet v. Rancourt, 627 So. 2d 586, 587 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).
321. Thus, a city might conceptually pass unchallenged or ministerial rezoning ordinances with a
minimum amount of additional effort, while seeking more detailed support and documentation for
heavily contested issues.
322. E.g., Fasano,507 P.2d at 29-30.
323. See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 472-73; Sunbelt Equities, 619 So. 2d at 1005; supra notes 6-10 and
accompanying text.
324. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 473 (quoting Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the
Presumption of Constitutionality in Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 2 (1992)). As one commentator
has noted, boards escape judicial reversal under the fairly debatable rule by first coming up with the
answer and then finding justification later to give support. Siemon, supra note 16, at 606-07. Siemon
has comically compared this decisionmaking process to the fictional madness in LEWIS CARROLL,
ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND (1865). Siemon, supra note 16, at 603 & n.l.
325. See supra text accompanying note 322.
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initial consistency analysis as required by LGCPA with the traditional
constitutional test for arbitrariness, unreasonableness, or discriminatory
animus.326 However, the court increases the burden of proof for both
tests to the substantial competent evidence standard in order to prevent ad

hoc rationalization and improper motives from influencing the rezoning
decision.327 To compensate for the increased standard of judicial review,
the court gives local governments zoning discretion by accepting the flexible definition of consistency.3 " In addition, the supreme court placed the
initial burden of production and presentation on the complainant,329
which will likely serve to discourage landowners from filing unsubstantiated appeals of rezoning decisions. Thus, in an effort to reform the inequities of the rezoning process, Snyder has developed a uniform standard of
judicial review that also respects the need for local government zoning

discretion.
2. Ex Parte Communication

Though Snyder provides a meaningful standard of review for sitespecific rezonings, its use of the functional approach creates more problems than it solves.33 ° In addition to strict scrutiny, the judicial label imparts on a proceeding many of the due process characteristics of a fair
" ' However, the question of ex parte communications332
trial.33
has
placed the applicability of the functional approach to site-specific
rezonings in serious doubt. As a result of Jennings v. Dade County,333
prima facie proof that a judicial officer received an ex parte communica-

tion creates a presumption that the contact was prejudicial.3" The burden
then shifts to the opponent to show by competent evidence that the contact

326. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 476.
327. Id. at 472-73, 475-76. As compared to the Snyder district court opinion, the supreme court
has actually lowered the burden of proof for local governments from the clear and convincing standard. Id. at 475.
328. See id.; supra notes 76-87 and accompanying text.
329. Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 476.
330. See infra part IV.C. for an alternative to the functional analysis.
331. See Sunbelt Equities, 619 So. 2d at 1002.
332. Ex parte means "by or for one party; done for, in behalf of, or on the application of, one
party only." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 576 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, ex parte communication occurs
when one party contacts any judicial decisionmaker or officer without having the adversary present.
333. 589 So. 2d 1337 (3d DCA 1991), rev. denied, 598 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1992).
334. Id. at 1339, 1341. In Jennings, a landowner hired a lobbyist to meet with individual members
of the Dade County Commission to discuss his variance application. Id. at 1339. An adjacent landowner sued on the grounds that the preheating contacts denied him due process. Id. The court agreed and
held that all such contacts were presumptively prejudicial. Id. at 1341. Although the subject of the
hearing in Jennings was a variance and not a rezoning, id. at 1339, the decision applies to all judicial
actions, id., and arguably to site-specific rezonings as well. Gougelman, supra note 25, at 26.
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was not prejudicial.335 Given the quasi-judicial nature of site-specific
rezonings, commissioners or other board officials must avoid any contact
with parties who may have an interest in a particular hearing.336
Not surprisingly, the combination of the judicial approach to rezonings
with the Jennings rule severely limits necessary contacts between elected
officials and their constituents.337 City or county commissioners represent
and must answer to voters in a limited geographical area.338 Thus,
commissioners rely on communication with citizens and organizations of
that area for a multifaceted understanding of important land development
issues.339 Elected officials who stay in close contact with their voters can
respond to their concerns and improve the efficacy of representative democracy. Citizens who have an open channel to their elected officials feel
more involved and in control of issues, like zoning, which directly concern
them.'
However, the Jennings ex parte rule as applied to the Snyder interpretation of site-specific rezonings would disallow most communication between officials and interested constituents regarding site-specific rezoning
" ' Such a result would further
hearings.34
distance and alienate an electorate already disillusioned by government scandal and mismanagement.2
Additionally, as a practical concern, local officials would have to avoid
reading their mail, cease answering their phones, and otherwise stop communicating with individuals and groups in their area for fear of engaging
in ex parte contact.343 Of course, if commissioners fail to maintain local

335. Jennings, 589 So. 2d at 1341.
336. Legislation, both proposed and in committee, has been drafted to overrule Jennings and restore the legitimacy of ex parte communications. See supra note 30, infra note 343.
337. See Cordes, supra note 6, at 208-09. Constituents may be in the form of individuals, homeowners associations, and environmental groups, to name a few. See Gougelman, supra note 25, at 28.
338. Although this note only addresses the functional approach as it affects issues of representative
democracy, the judicial label also controls whether citizens may directly enter the zoning process
through initiative and referendum. See generally Kublicki, supra note 9 (discussing the relationship between democratic processes and judicial review of zoning decisions).
339. See id. at 155.
340. Cf id. at 114-15 (stating that the origin of direct public involvement in lawmaking was a
distrust of legislatures acting in absence of such involvement).
341. See supra notes 334-35 and accompanying text. This is contrary to the expressed legislative
intent of LGCPA. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3181(1) (1993). Thus, insofar as an issue involves consistency
with a comprehensive plan or constitutionality under LGCPA, public participation should be encouraged and not dissuaded.
342. See City of Hialeah Gardens v. John L. Adams & Co., 599 So. 2d 1322, 1325 n.4 (3d DCA),
rev. denied, 613 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1992).
343. Arguably, under this definition, a commissioner running into an interested constituent at a
grocery store would not be allowed to answer her questions on a proposed shopping center project. A
state legislative committee bill is attempting to address such issues by proposing a statute to legalize
some forms of ex parte communication. See HOUSE COMM. ON COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, ACCESS TO
LOCAL PUBLIC OFFICIALS, BILL ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, Fla. 1993 Reg. Sess.,
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contact or adequately represent their constituents, they may be voted out
of office at the next election.' Thus, the application of the functional
approach to site-specific rezonings hinders communication between elected
officials and their voters, prevents elected officials from offering the best
representation possible, and discourages public interest in local zoning
issues. 45
Additionally, the Jennings rule combined with the Snyder functional

approach could prevent commissioners from consulting with city attorneys,
local committees, planning boards, and other informed sources for legal or
technical advice."

Ideally, all commissioners should have degrees in

civil engineering, chemistry, law, and agriculture as a prerequisite to taking office. However, in reality, elected officials may have no more technical knowledge than the average citizen. Thus, officials need to ask questions about a particular rezoning issue before they are inundated with
evidence at a time-pressured hearing. But the application of the ex parte
rule would seemingly forbid any of these contacts outside the scope of the

rezoning hearing. As a result of the application of the Jennings rule in
conjunction with the functional approach, the ex parte prohibition sacrifices legitimate representation of voters to achieve limited bias control. 4 7
Nevertheless, unfettered access to ex parte contacts may indeed unduly
influence local officials or create the appearance of impropriety." To
discourage questionable lobbying practices in the context of site-specific
rezonings, some limitations should be placed on the ex parte privilege.
Although one-sided contacts may not be prejudicial to the hearing, council
members should disclose on the record the nature and subject matter of ex

PCB CA 94-05, at 1 (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter LOCAL ACCEss]. The proposed bill also provides
methods for disclosure and recusal. Id. at 4.
344. See Kublicki, supra note 9, at 156.
345. Local governments faced with this ex parte dilemma have been forced to at least examine
alternative rezoning procedures to cover themselves in case of litigation. See No Hearing Officer to be
Hired, GAINESVILLE SuN, Feb. 23, 1994, at 2B. For example, the Alachua County Commission recently declined to hire a hearing officer to receive public input and comment on zoning petitions. Id. In
rejecting this proposal, a county commissioner stated that he could "talk to any citizen of Alachua
County about anything they [sic] want to talk to me about:' Id. However, the Commission requested
that county staff survey the use and effectiveness of hearing officers in other jurisdictions. Id.
346. Although Jennings does not address commissioners' access to nonlobbyists, the opinion
seems to prohibit any contact from any interested party which may present a nonneutral opinion. See
Jennings, 589 So. 2d at 1341; Gougelman, supra note 25, at 28. Lawyers, engineers, and other specialists may be interested parties either by direct representation or by expert status.
347. See Cordes, supra note 6, at 196 (stating that courts must control biased zoning practices
without limiting effective representation by local officials). As a result of Jennings and Snyder, the
Florida Legislature is trying to block the negative effect of the functional approach with legislation
that would allow full communication with public officials. See supra notes 30, 343. Although this
legislative effort might solve the ex parte issue, it is merely a bandage and not a cure for the problems
of the functional approach.
348. Cordes, supra note 6, at 208-09.
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parte communications with any party or interested lobby group. The board
should also provide opponents with reasonable opportunity to respond to
the content of any ex parte communications."4 Additionally, to avoid bias, board members must base their decision on the evidence on record,
and not on secret ex parte evidence.350 Under a more flexible analysis,
board members could receive ex parte communication without fear of per
se prejudice, if reasonably regulated. Unfortunately, however, characterizing site-specific rezonings as a quasi-judicial function subjects these decisions to a set of rigid due process rules better suited for the courts rather
than county commissions.
3. Rezoning Hearings as Legal Minitrials
By only addressing the standard of review and consistency issues, the
Snyder court failed to resolve many of the conflicts at the district level
regarding rezoning hearings and procedure. In addition to ex parte discussions, the quasi-judicial label as applied to site-specific rezonings could
turn commission hearings into "minitrials."35 By finding rezonings to be
quasi-judicial functions, the Snyder court implicitly required local governments to implement quasi-judicial procedures.352 While these hearings
need not follow formal rules of evidence,353 the Snyder court failed to
address the extent to which they must take on judicial characteristics."
Nonetheless, the functional approach seems to support a formalized,
trial-like administrative procedure.355 By requiring zoning boards to make
decisions based on substantial competent evidence,356 they must somehow determine the relevancy of all testimony placed on the record. In
order to meet this standard of proof, the parties must submit technical
reports, impact statements, and other affidavits into evidence. A zoning
board faced with a full agenda may have difficulty coping with the evidentiary issues of relevancy, ex parte disclosures, and objections to evidence, as well as the parties' attempts to construct a record of the testimony presented.357 Such a situation may require zoning boards to con349. See LOCAL ACCESS, supra note 343, at 4.
350. See Thorn v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 146 So. 2d 907, 910 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962).
351. In discussing the Snyder district court opinion, Paul Gougelman used this term to characterize
how the functional approach makes rezoning hearings more like a court proceeding than a part of
representative government. See Gougelman, supra note 25, at 27.
352. Other authorities have already made this logical step. See Fasano, 507 P.2d at 30; Holman,
supra note 17, at 142-43.
353. Sunbelt Equities, 619 So. 2d at 1002 (quoting Jennings, 589 So. 2d at 1340).
354. Both Florida courts and the legislature have required at least notice of and an opportunity to
speak at all quasi-judicial zoning hearings. Id.; La Croix, supra note 14, at 107.
355. See Holman, supra note 17, at 140-41.
356. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
357. Gougelman, supra note 25, at 27. Such a record is necessary to preserve objections for ap-
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duct evidentiary "meetings," similar to judicial pretrial conferences, before
the hearing in order to keep meetings from running late into the night.35
Even with legal counsel available, local commissions unaccustomed to
dealing with evidentiary rules may find many of their decisions overturned
by a court, simply because of unclear or unstated standards of quasi-judicial procedure. 59 Usually, these evidentiary questions only appear in the
courtroom setting. But under the quasi-judicial standard, zoning boards
and county commissions would likely have to face these judicial problems
every time they hear a site-specific rezoning request.
Furthermore, the quasi-judicial approach could require contestants of
site-specific rezoning decisions to hire legal counsel expert witnesses.
Generally, lay persons are strangers to the necessities of quasi-judicial
hearings." Under the functional approach, lay opinion testimony could
be disregarded as nonprobative, which would force individuals to hire lawyers and experts to produce admissible and competent evidence at the
hearing. In effect, rezoning hearings would turn into a war of experts,
where often underfunded private interests must battle well-defended and
well-financed municipalities. Moreover, individuals would have to make a
record, preferably verbatim, and have all objections preserved on that
" ' Interested
record in the event they wish to appeal the board's decision.36
parties or groups may find themselves hard-pressed to defend their positions at rezoning hearings if they cannot afford to retain counsel or experts. The formalistic rules of quasi-judicial procedure may transform local
hearings into veritable trials for citizens who want to challenge proposed
rezoning decisions.362 Thus, the functional approach, despite its commendable goals of zoning reform, would likely discourage individual
participation in rezoning decisions and further alienate citizens from the
democratic process.363

peal. See Battaglia Fruit Co. v. City of Maitland, 530 So. 2d 940, 943-44 (5th DCA), cause dismissed,
537 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1988).
358. See Gougelman, supra note 25, at 27-28.
359. See id. at 28.
360. See id.
361. See supra note 357.
362. See supra note 351 and accompanying text.
363. The functional approach affects many other areas of the rezoning process. This note attempts
to highlight some of the major issues. However, the use of the quasi-judicial label affects many other
aspects of land use decisions. For example, the functional approach may affect the system of initiative
and referendum, which promotes direct involvement in government decisions. However, this system is
only applicable to legislative actions. See Florida Land Co. v. City of Winter Springs, 427 So. 2d 170,
172-73 (Fla. 1983); Kublicki, supra note 9, at 117-18. Also, the quasi-judicial distinction brings up the
issue of administrative res judicata, which applies to quasi-judicial actions. See Coral Reef Nurseries v.
Babcock Co., 410 So. 2d 648, 651-54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Another question raised by the functional
approach is its application to other land use decisions. See Gougelman, supra note 25, at 29. In Puma
v. City of Melbourne, No. 90-10022-CA-XIS (18th Cir. Ct. amended order of May 13, 1992), afTd,
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C. The Consistency Doctrine: An Alternative
to the FunctionalAnalysis
At first glance, the functional approach provides the means to inject
judicial scrutiny into site-specific rezoning procedures in order to hasten
zoning reform. By labeling these rezoning decisions as quasi-judicial,
courts can view them with stricter scrutiny.3" Nonetheless, the application of the functional approach has side effects which may inexorably
burden local administrative procedure and alienate citizens from the rezoning process."
However, the consistency doctrine offers a starting point for an alternative to the functional approach."6 According to LGCPA, courts can
insure that development orders are consistent with all aspects of the local
comprehensive plan without violating the separation of powers doctrine.367 By definition, the consistency analysis would also cover the Euclid test of constitutionality, because arbitrary, discriminatory, or unreasonable decisions do not promote orderly development of land.368 As compliance with LGCPA is mandatory in Florida, all challenged development
orders would follow the Snyder consistency and judicial review standards.369 Thus, placing rezonings under LGCPA's consistency test would
fully reflect the Snyder opinion's desire to reform the zoning process.
However, the consistency approach would not require courts to analyze the form and function of a rezoning decision on a case-by-case basis.37° The statutory definition of development orders would cover all
rezonings, both specific and general, as well as development permits,
variances, planned unit developments, and special exceptions.37 Courts
could enforce strict judicial scrutiny without relying upon the legal fiction
of the quasi-judicial label and without applying quasi-judicial rules to the

616 So. 2d 190 (5th DCA 1993) (per curiam), remanded, 630 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1994) (per curiam),
the trial court applied the functional approach to an amendment of a comprehensive planning map.
Gougelman, supra note 25, at 29. The quasi-judicial standard was used because the property was less
than four acres in size and had only one owner. Id. However, amendments of comprehensive plans
have previously been ruled legislative in nature. See, e.g., Rinker Materials Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade
County, 528 So. 2d 904, 906 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
364. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
365. See supra part IV.B.
366. See Lincoln, supra note 31, at 377-82.
367. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(4)(a) (1993).
368. The Snyder court also stated that the traditional constitutionality test is to be subsumed within
the consistency analysis. See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 476.
369. See supra text accompanying notes 327-29.
370. This would eliminate most of the problems with ex parte communication, evidentiary standards, and quasi-judicial formalism. See Lincoln, supra note 31, at 380-82 (criticizing certiorari or appellate-style review of zoning decisions).
371. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3164(7) (1993).
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local administrative process.372 Rezoning decisions would be treated as
legislative functions for the purpose of establishing due process and other
procedural requirements.373 Although the legislature would likely need to
provide statutory guidance,374 an approach directed mainly at the consistency requirement provides a viable alternative to the unwelcome effects
of the functional approach.
V. CONCLUSION

For many years, local zoning and planning systems have developed
erratically because of self-interest, political motivation, and ad hoc reasoning. In response to these concerns, many legal scholars have recognized
the need to reform local decisionmaking systems. Florida has pursued two
main avenues of reform. First, the legislature passed LGCPA, a comprehensive planning statute, and required that local zoning decisions conform
to a long-term goal. Second, Florida courts have interpreted site-specific
rezoning decisions as quasi-judicial functions and subjected them to stricter judicial scrutiny. Over time, each judicial district has developed a different method of review for site-specific rezoning decisions, which has
fostered incoherence and unpredictability in zoning law. The Florida Supreme Court finally formulated an innovative review scheme which provides for a stricter consistency analysis but retains some local government
discretion.
Although the Snyder decision produced a uniform system of review,
the use of the functional approach has produced new questions and difficulties which will likely require future judicial intervention. The Snyder
court's test for quasi-judicial action will undoubtedly produce conflicting
results as courts analyze the scope and impact of zoning decisions.
Moreover, the application of the quasi-judicial label may completely endanger current zoning procedures. Zoning boards and local governments
are ill-equipped to deal with judicial issues of relevant evidence and ex
parte communication. Furthermore, the application of rigid quasi-judicial
procedural rules will require interested persons to retain counsel and expert witnesses in order to challenge zoning decisions. Finally, the functional approach will keep citizens alienated from their elected officials and
from rezoning decisions that directly affect their property.
Unfortunately, Snyder failed to guide the district courts of appeal in

372. See, e.g., Lincoln, supra note 31, at 380-82.
373. Of course, all statutory due process guarantees would remain intact. See La Croix, supra note
14, at 107.
374. See Lincoln, supra note 31, at 383.
375. See id. at 380-82.
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resolving future difficulties with the functional approach.376 Although
state legislators have proposed statutes to legalize ex parte communications with elected officials, this is only a piecemeal response to the quasijudicial problems. The quasi-judicial label affects many aspects of the
local decisionmaking process, from the standard of review to the applicability of initiative and referendum. Additionally, Snyder does not preclude
the application of the functional approach to other land use decisions, such
as limited amendments of comprehensive plans.
Thus, the consistency requirement of comprehensive planning may
provide an alternative to the functional approach. Consistency review
ensures that most local development decisions will comply both with
LGCPA and with constitutional standards. Additionally, this system would
implement the strict judicial review and flexible consistency approaches of
Snyder. Moreover, the use of the consistency doctrine would not apply
quasi-judicial standards of procedure to rezoning decisions. Regardless of
the alternatives, however, the Snyder decision provides little guidance for
lower courts to uniformly interpret and apply the functional approach to
site-specific rezoning decisions.

376. Many of the post-Snyder rezoning decisions to the Florida Supreme Court have simply been
remanded for further consideration consistent with Snyder. See City of Melbourne v. Puma, 630 So. 2d
1097 (Fla. 1994) (per curiam), remanding 616 So. 2d 190 (5th DCA 1993) (per curiam); O'Connor
Dev. Corp. v. Leon County, 630 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1994), quashing Board of County Comm'rs v.
Monticello Drug Co., 619 So. 2d 361 (1st DCA 1993).
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